|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
00000cam a2200000 a 4500 |
| 001 |
JSTOR_on1298208426 |
| 003 |
OCoLC |
| 005 |
20231005004200.0 |
| 006 |
m o d |
| 007 |
cr ||||||||||| |
| 008 |
060727s2007 njua ob 001 0 eng |
| 010 |
|
|
|a 2021694897
|
| 040 |
|
|
|a DLC
|b eng
|e pn
|c DLC
|d INARC
|d OCLCF
|d JSTOR
|d EBLCP
|d P@U
|d UKAHL
|d RDF
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|
| 015 |
|
|
|a GBA6A2332
|2 bnb
|
| 016 |
7 |
|
|a 013618758
|2 Uk
|
| 019 |
|
|
|a 1195022513
|a 1259589742
|a 1273306191
|a 1289808888
|a 1294374339
|a 1303451924
|a 1396921185
|
| 020 |
|
|
|a 9780691233864
|q ebook
|
| 020 |
|
|
|a 0691233861
|
| 020 |
|
|
|z 9780691127132 (alk. paper)
|
| 020 |
|
|
|z 0691127131 (alk. paper)
|
| 029 |
1 |
|
|a AU@
|b 000069752110
|
| 029 |
1 |
|
|a AU@
|b 000074667607
|
| 035 |
|
|
|a (OCoLC)1298208426
|z (OCoLC)1195022513
|z (OCoLC)1259589742
|z (OCoLC)1273306191
|z (OCoLC)1289808888
|z (OCoLC)1294374339
|z (OCoLC)1303451924
|z (OCoLC)1396921185
|
| 037 |
|
|
|a 22573/ctv1nhv2n0
|b JSTOR
|
| 050 |
0 |
0 |
|a HF5478
|
| 072 |
|
7 |
|a BUS
|x 090000
|2 bisacsh
|
| 072 |
|
7 |
|a BUS
|x 069000
|2 bisacsh
|
| 072 |
|
7 |
|a BUS
|x 016000
|2 bisacsh
|
| 082 |
0 |
0 |
|a 381/.177015193
|
| 084 |
|
|
|a 54.84
|2 bcl
|
| 049 |
|
|
|a UAMI
|
| 100 |
1 |
|
|a Steiglitz, Kenneth,
|d 1939-
|
| 245 |
1 |
0 |
|a Snipers, shills, & sharks :
|b eBay and human behavior /
|c Ken Steiglitz.
|
| 246 |
3 |
|
|a Snipers, shills, and sharks
|
| 260 |
|
|
|a Princeton :
|b Princeton University Press,
|c c2007.
|
| 300 |
|
|
|a 1 online resource (xix, 276 p.)
|
| 336 |
|
|
|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
|
| 337 |
|
|
|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
|
| 338 |
|
|
|a online resource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
|
| 504 |
|
|
|a Includes bibliographical references (p. 263-270) and index.
|
| 588 |
|
|
|a Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed.
|
| 505 |
0 |
|
|a Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- To the general reader -- To students and course instructors -- Synopsis -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter One · English and Vickrey Auctions -- 1.1 Auctions -- 1.2 A Brief History -- 1.3 English Auctions -- 1.4 Variations on the English Theme -- 1.5 Truthful Bidding is Dominant in (Japanese Button) English Auctions -- 1.6 Sealed-bid Second-Price (Vickrey) Auctions -- 1.7 Mail-bid Auctions -- 1.8 Weak Strategic Equivalence of (Japanese button) English and Vickrey Auctions -- 1.9 The Four Standard Auctions and Why They Are Two Pairs -- 1.10 Disincentives to truthful bidding -- 1.11 Questions -- Chapter Two · From Vickrey to eBay -- 2.1 eBay as an Evolutionary Product of Vickrey: The California Auction -- 2.2 Other Online Auction Rules -- 2.3 eBay _= Vickrey -- 2.4 Summary -- 2.5 Questions -- Chapter Three · eBay Strategies Observed -- 3.1 Some Bidding Histories -- 3.1.1 Start and End Clustering, Snipers -- 3.1.2 A Bidding War -- 3.1.3 An Early Bidder and Her Fate -- 3.2 "Enter Your Maximum, Then Sit Back and Watch!'' -- 3.3 Good Reasons to Snipe -- 3.4 Other (Generally Good) Reasons to Snipe -- 3.4.1 Bidding Wars, Response to Incremental Bidding -- 3.4.2 Implicit Collusion -- 3.4.3 Nonstrategic Reasons to Bid Late -- 3.5 Some (Questionable) Reasons to Bid Early -- 3.5.1 Uncertain Values and the Cost of Discovery -- 3.5.2 Scaring Away Competition -- 3.5.3 Nonstrategic Reasons to Bid Early -- 3.6 On Balance, Snipe -- 3.7 Seller Choices -- 3.7.1 Opening Bid -- 3.7.2 Use of a Secret Reserve -- 3.7.3 Use of the Buy-It-Now Option -- 3.7.4 Other Seller Choices -- 3.8 The Next Three Chapters -- 3.9 Questions -- Chapter Four · What If eBayWere First-Price? -- 4.1 First-Price Is the More Natural Assumption -- 4.2 The Sealed-Bid First-Price Auction -- 4.3 The Simplest of All Worlds.
|
| 505 |
8 |
|
|a 4.3.1 The Independent Private Values (IPV) model -- 4.4 How to Shade -- 4.5 Revenue: The Bottom Line -- 4.6 A First-Price eBay Would Discourage Early Bidding -- 4.7 First-Price Is More Work for the Bidder -- 4.8 Further Theory Disappoints -- 4.9 Conclusion -- 4.10 Questions -- Chapter Five · The Signals that Sellers Send -- 5.1 Reserves -- 5.2 Price Estimates and Related Revelations -- 5.3 Virtue Rewarded, in Theory -- 5.4 Art, Silver, and Jewelry Auctions: Empirical Observations of Seller Price Estimates -- 5.5 The Complexity of the Seller's Signaling -- 5.6 What Theory Has To Say About Reserves -- 5.6.1 The Tradeoff in Second-Price Auctions -- 5.6.2 The Tradeoff in First-Price Auctions -- 5.6.3 The Optimal Reserve -- 5.6.4 The New Equilibrium -- 5.6.5 Practical Implications -- 5.7 Field Experiments -- 5.8 A Field Comparison of Public vs. Secret Reserves on eBay -- 5.9 Lucking-Reiley's Magic Window in Time -- 5.9.1 Field Confirmation of Some First-Price Theory -- 5.10 Flatness of Revenue vs. Reserve Curves -- 5.11 The Importance of the Extra Bidder -- 5.12 Extracting Some Advice for the eBay Seller -- 5.13 Questions -- Chapter Six · Prices! -- 6.1 Appraising the Scaffolding -- 6.1.1 Valuations -- 6.1.2 Equilibrium -- 6.1.3 Homo economicus -- 6.2 Overbidding: Some Classroom Experiments -- 6.2.1 Experiment 1: First-price with Uniformly Distributed Valuations -- 6.2.2 Experiment 2: First-Price with Less Competition -- 6.3 Feedback and Learning -- 6.3.1 Feedback in First-Price Auctions -- 6.3.2 Feedback in Second-Price and English Auctions -- 6.4 Overbidding: Jars of Nickels -- 6.5 Results from the Field: Tests of Revenue Equivalence -- 6.5.1 Magic on the Internet: A Surprise -- 6.5.2 Music CDs and Xboxes on eBay -- 6.6 Reconciliations -- 6.7 Equilibrium Regained -- 6.7.1 Risk Aversion -- 6.7.2 Spite: An Alternative Theory.
|
| 505 |
8 |
|
|a 6.8 The Theoretically Informed (and Human) eBay Bidder -- 6.8.1 Simply a Mistake: Bidding Untruthfully in Vickrey's Setting -- 6.8.2 The Winner's Curse -- 6.8.3 Lessons from the Failures of Revenue Equivalence -- 6.8.4 Spiteful Behavior -- 6.8.5 Wars, Frenzies, and Bubbles -- 6.9 Questions -- Chapter Seven · Transgressions -- 7.1 Shills -- 7.1.1 Shill Bidding and Theory -- 7.1.2 Mock Auctions: The More Important Diamond -- 7.2 Bidder Rings: 84 Charing Cross Road -- 7.3 Ethics -- 7.3.1 The Twinge of Guilt: The Buyer Withholds Information -- 7.3.2 Conversely: The Seller Withholds Information -- 7.3.3 Sniping -- 7.3.4 Shadowing Bidders -- 7.3.5 The Ethics of Feedback -- 7.3.6 Exporting and Importing Ancient Artifacts -- 7.4 A Note on Downright Fraud -- 7.5 Fakes -- 7.6 Questions -- Chapter Eight · Epilogue -- 8.1 Looking Back -- 8.2 Looking Ahead -- Appendix A: Vickrey's Genesis -- A.1 Introduction -- A.2 A Preview of Revenue Equivalence -- A.3 * Quick Review of Some Probability Theory -- A.4 * Order Statistics -- A.5 Revenue of Second-Price Auctions -- A.6 First-Price Auctions and Nash Equilibria -- A.7 Revenue Equivalence of First- and Second-Price Auctions with Uniformly Distributed Values -- A.8 A Nash Equilibrium for First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions -- A.9 Revenue of First-Price Auctions -- A.10 * Conditional Expectation -- A.11 An Interpretation of First-Price Equilibrium Bidding Strategy -- A.12 Stronger Revenue Equivalence -- A.13 Dutch Auctions and Strategic Equivalence -- A.14 Another Kind of Auction-the All-Pay Auction -- A.15 Questions -- Appendix B: Riley and Samuelson's Optimal Auctions -- B.1 Definition of Riley and Samuelson's Class -- B.2 Revenue -- B.3 Optimal Reserve Price -- B.3.1 Example: First-Price Auction with Reserve -- B.3.2 Example: Second-Price Auction with Reserve -- B.4 Sad Losers and Santa Claus.
|
| 505 |
8 |
|
|a B.4.1 The Sad-Loser Auction -- B.4.2 The Santa Claus Auction -- B.5 The All-Pay Auction Revisited -- B.6 Risk Aversion -- B.7 Point of Departure -- B.8 Questions -- Appendix C: Myerson's Optimal Mechanisms -- C.1 Directions -- C.2 Interdependent Values -- C.3 Asymmetric Bidders -- C.4 Efficiency -- C.5 Myerson's Optimal Mechanism in the Asymmetric-Bidder Case -- C.5.1 Interlude: Revenue Equivalence Revisited in the Asymmetric-Bidder Case -- C.5.2 The Optimal Allocation Rule -- C.5.3 The Payment Rule -- C.5.4 A Wrinkle -- C.5.5 Is This Practical? -- C.6 Optimal Riley and Samuelson Auctions Are Optimal Mechanisms -- C.7 Auctions vs. Negotiations -- C.8 Summary -- C.9 Questions -- Appendix D: Laboratory Evidence: A Summary -- D.1 Introduction -- D.2 Laboratory Experiments -- D.3 Experimental Results for the IPV Model -- D.4 Experimental Results for the Common-Value Model -- References -- Index.
|
| 590 |
|
|
|a JSTOR
|b Books at JSTOR Evidence Based Acquisitions
|
| 590 |
|
|
|a JSTOR
|b Books at JSTOR All Purchased
|
| 590 |
|
|
|a JSTOR
|b Books at JSTOR Demand Driven Acquisitions (DDA)
|
| 610 |
2 |
7 |
|a eBay Inc.
|2 gnd
|
| 610 |
2 |
7 |
|a EBay.
|2 swd
|
| 650 |
|
0 |
|a Internet auctions
|x Simulation methods.
|
| 650 |
|
0 |
|a Game theory.
|
| 650 |
|
2 |
|a Game Theory
|
| 650 |
|
6 |
|a Vente aux enchères sur Internet
|x Méthodes de simulation.
|
| 650 |
|
6 |
|a Théorie des jeux.
|
| 650 |
|
7 |
|a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / E-Commerce / General
|2 bisacsh
|
| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Game theory
|2 fast
|
| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Verbraucherverhalten
|2 gnd
|
| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Spieltheorie
|2 gnd
|
| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Internetauktion
|2 gnd
|
| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Auktionstheorie
|2 gnd
|
| 776 |
0 |
8 |
|i Print version:
|t Snipers, shills, & sharks
|d Princeton : Princeton University Press, c2007.
|z 9780691127132 (alk. paper)
|w (DLC) 2006050389
|
| 830 |
|
0 |
|a Book collections on Project MUSE.
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://jstor.uam.elogim.com/stable/10.2307/j.ctv1nj34p1
|z Texto completo
|
| 938 |
|
|
|a Internet Archive
|b INAR
|n snipersshillssha0000stei
|
| 938 |
|
|
|a ProQuest Ebook Central
|b EBLB
|n EBL6665543
|
| 938 |
|
|
|a Project MUSE
|b MUSE
|n musev2_85217
|
| 938 |
|
|
|a Askews and Holts Library Services
|b ASKH
|n AH39069801
|
| 994 |
|
|
|a 92
|b IZTAP
|
