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We Have Always Been Cyborgs : Digital Data, Gene Technologies, and an Ethics of Transhumanism.

This visionary new book explores the critical issues that link transhumanism with digitalisation, gene technologies and ethics. It examines the history and meaning of transhumanism, offering insightful reflections on values, norms and utopia.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Sorgner, Stefan Lorenz
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Bristol : Bristol University Press, 2021.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Front Cover
  • Testimonials page
  • We Have Always Been Cyborgs: Digital Data, Gene Technologies, and an Ethics of Transhumanism
  • Copyright information
  • Table of contents
  • List of abbreviations
  • Acknowledgments
  • 1 Transhumanism: In a Nutshell
  • 1.1 Philosophical issues
  • 1.2 Transhumanism as nihilistic, positive pessimism
  • 1.2.1 Pessimism
  • 1.2.2 Positivity
  • 1.2.3 Nihilism
  • 1.3 Conclusion
  • 2 On a Silicon-based Transhumanism
  • 2.1 Transhumanism without mind uploading and immortality
  • 2.1.1 Elon Musk and the simulation argument
  • 2.1.2 Implicit assumptions of the simulation argument
  • 2.1.3 Immortality now
  • 2.1.4 Conclusion
  • 2.2 A democratic usage of our digital data as pragmatic must-have?
  • 2.2.1 We have always been cyborgs6
  • 2.2.2 Personal interests in data collection9
  • 2.2.3 Ageing as disease11
  • 2.2.4 Political interests in data collection
  • 2.2.5 Internet panopticon20
  • 2.2.6 A European social credit system as a pragmatic necessity
  • 2.2.7 An as-good-as-it-gets ethic of reducing violence
  • 2.2.8 Truthfulness, mindfulness, and impulse control as means to strengthen autonomy
  • 2.2.9 Conclusion
  • 2.2.10 Final thoughts related to the COVID-19 pandemic
  • 2.2.11 Glocalization and the war for digital data34
  • 3 On a Carbon-based Transhumanism
  • 3.1 From Nietzsche's overhuman to the posthuman of transhumanism
  • 3.1.1 Reflections on this challenge
  • 3.1.2 Implications for contemporary discourses
  • 3.1.3 Conclusion
  • 3.2 Moral (bio)enhancement
  • 3.2.1 Moral bioenhancement by means of citalopram
  • 3.2.2 Moral (bio)enhancement as legal obligation
  • 3.2.3 Moral (bio)enhancement as free choice
  • 3.2.4 Further moral bioenhancement options
  • 3.2.5 The relationship between cognitive and moral development
  • 3.2.6 Conclusion
  • 3.3 Gene modification
  • 3.3.1 On the relationship between educational and genetic enhancement24
  • 3.3.2 Irreversibility of genetic enhancement
  • 3.3.3 Reversibility of educational enhancement
  • 3.3.4 Autonomy
  • 3.3.5 Instrumentalization
  • 3.3.6 Equality
  • 3.3.7 Therapy and enhancement
  • 3.3.8 Educational enhancement is necessary but genetic enhancement is not
  • 3.3.9 Conclusion
  • 3.4 Gene selection
  • 3.4.1 Creating children and the principle of PB
  • 3.4.2 Counter-arguments against the principle of PB
  • 3.4.2.1 General concerns
  • 3.4.2.2 Inconsistencies
  • 3.4.2.3 PB as a violent and hence an immoral principle
  • 3.4.3 Conclusion
  • 4 A Fictive Ethics
  • 4.1 Using gene technologies as a vice?
  • 4.1.1 Nietzsche's communitarianism, virtue ethics, and the overhuman
  • 4.1.2 Sandel's virtue-ethical rejection of genetic enhancement
  • 4.1.3 A Nietzschean critique of Sandel's criticism of genetic enhancement
  • 4.1.4 Conclusion
  • 4.2 Three transhumanist types of human perfection
  • 4.2.1 The Renaissance ideal
  • 4.2.2 A common-sense account
  • 4.2.3 Radical pluralism
  • 4.2.4 Conclusion