Self-policing in politics : the political economy of reputational controls on politicians /

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"Just as businesses' poor behavior can cause brand names to be tarnished, prices to plummet, and future business to disappear, dishonest politicians stand to sacrifice the human capital invested in their careers, and premiums for honesty, such as electoral security and prestigious post-ele...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Parker, Glenn R., 1946- (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, [2004]
Temas:
Political ethics > Economic aspects.
Political corruption > Economic aspects.
Self-control > Economic aspects.
Legislators > United States.
Morale politique > Aspect économique.
Corruption (Politique) > Aspect économique.
Maîtrise de soi > Aspect économique.
Parlementaires > États-Unis.
members of Congress.
POLITICAL SCIENCE / American Government / General
Legislators
Political corruption > Economic aspects
Politiker
Politische Ethik
Prestige
Selbstkontrolle
Verhaltenskodex
Wirtschaft
United States
USA
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • What is opportunism and how do we control it?
  • How reputations control cheating in economics and politics
  • Problems in the market for legislators
  • Hypotheses, measurement, and data
  • Constraining opportunism through self-policing
  • Reputational capital and job security; or, If trustworthy legislators are at a premium, are they paid one?
  • Weaknesses in reputational controls.

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