INSIDER OWNERSHIP, SHAREHOLDER STRUCTURES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: MOLDENHAUER, BENJAMIN
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: [S.l.] : DUNCKER & HUMBLOT, 2020.
Colección:Entrepreneurial and financial studies.
Temas:
Corporate governance.
Consolidation and merger of corporations.
Gouvernement d'entreprise.
Entreprises > Fusion.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Entrepreneurship
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Intro
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgements
  • Table of Contents
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • List of Abbreviations
  • 1 Corporate Governance and the Role of Insider Ownership
  • 1.1 Why Do Corporate Governance and Insider Ownership Matter?
  • 1.2 Aims of the Study
  • 1.3 Structure of the Analysis
  • 2 Fundamentals of Corporate Governance
  • 2.1 Definition and Understanding of Corporate Governance
  • 2.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms
  • 2.2.1 Business Objective and Shareholder Value
  • 2.2.2 Conflicts between Shareholders and Management
  • 2.2.3 Mechanisms to Control Management
  • 2.3 Basic Types of Corporate Governance Systems
  • 2.3.1 The Capital Market Oriented System
  • 2.3.2 The Corporate Law Oriented System
  • 2.3.3 Which Corporate Governance System is Best?
  • 2.4 The German System of Corporate Governance
  • 2.4.1 Historical Development
  • 2.4.2 Status Quo
  • 2.4.3 Characteristics and Idiosyncrasies
  • 2.4.4 Trends and Outlook
  • 3 Causes and Consequences of Shareholder Structures in Theory and Practice of Corporate Governance
  • 3.1 The Separation of Ownership and Control
  • 3.2 Constitution of the German Stock Corporation
  • 3.2.1 Management Board
  • 3.2.2 Supervisory Board
  • 3.2.3 Shareholders' Meeting
  • 3.3 Shareholders' Objectives and Control Incentives
  • 3.3.1 Systematization of Shareholders' Interests
  • 3.3.2 Shareholder Identity as Differentiating Factor
  • 3.3.2.1 Insider Individuals (MGMT)
  • 3.3.2.1.1 Members of the Management Board (MB)
  • 3.3.2.1.2 Members of the Supervisory Board (SB)
  • 3.3.2.1.3 Former Members of the Boards (FBM)
  • 3.3.2.2 Non-financial Companies (CORP)
  • 3.3.2.2.1 Business Groups (BGR)
  • 3.3.2.2.2 Corporations (COR)
  • 3.3.2.3 Financial Institutions (FINC)
  • 3.3.2.3.1 Banks (BANK)
  • 3.3.2.3.2 Insurance Companies (INSR)
  • 3.3.2.3.3 Investment Companies (INVC)
  • 3.3.2.3.4 Domestic Institutional Investors (INST)
  • 3.3.2.3.5 Foreign Institutional Investors (INST-F)
  • 3.3.2.4 Federal, State and Municipal Government (GOV)
  • 3.3.2.5 Miscellaneous (MISC)
  • 3.3.2.5.1 Outsider Individuals (INVD)
  • 3.3.2.5.2 Employees (EMP)
  • 3.3.2.5.3 Others (OTH) and Treasury Shares (TRE)
  • 3.3.3 Shareholder Concentration as Differentiating Factor
  • 3.3.3.1 Minority Shareholders
  • 3.3.3.1.1 Smallholders
  • 3.3.3.1.2 Simple Blockholders
  • 3.3.3.1.3 Dominating Blockholders
  • 3.3.3.2 Majority Shareholders
  • 3.3.3.2.1 Simple Majority Blockholders
  • 3.3.3.2.2 Super Majority Blockholders
  • 3.4 Shareholders, Management and Conflicts of Interest
  • 3.4.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 3.4.2 Systematical Analysis of Potential Conflicts of Interest
  • 3.4.2.1 Between Shareholders and Management
  • 3.4.2.2 Among Shareholders
  • 3.4.3 Ways and Means for Overcoming Conflicts of Interest
  • 4 Insider Ownership and its Effects on Corporate Performance
  • 4.1 Insider Ownership According to Different Theoretical Views
  • 4.1.1 The Neoclassical View
  • 4.1.2 The Institutional View

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