Interest Groups and Trade Policy.

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Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman are widely acclaimed for their pioneering theoretical studies of how special interest groups seek to influence the policymaking process in democratic societies. This collection of eight of their previously published articles is a companion to their recent monograph,...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Grossman, Gene M (Autor)
Otros Autores: Helpman, Elhanan
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2002.
Temas:
Commercial policy.
Pressure groups.
Pressure groups > United States.
Politique commerciale.
Groupes de pression.
Pressure groups
Commercial policy
Trade agreements > interest groups.
Free trade > interest groups.
Interest groups > trade policy.
United States > Commercial policy.
United States
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover page
  • Half-title
  • Title page
  • Copyright page
  • Contents
  • Introduction
  • 1. Special Interest Politics
  • 2. Articles in this Collection
  • 2.1 Part I: Methodology
  • 2.2 Part II: Applications to Trade Policy
  • 3. Empirical Validation
  • References
  • Part I: Instruments of Influence
  • 1. Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. General Theory
  • 2.1 Equilibrium
  • 2.2 Truthful Equilibria
  • 2.3 Quasi-Linear Preferences
  • 3. Application to Government Policy Makin
  • References
  • 2. Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Related Literature
  • 3. The Model
  • 3.1 The Voters
  • 3.2 The Parties and the Government
  • 3.3 The Special Interests
  • 3.4 Political Equilibrium
  • 3.5 Functional Forms
  • 4. Equilibrium with One Lobby
  • 4.1 Contributions with Only an Influence Motive
  • 4.2 When Is an Electoral Motive Operative?
  • 5. Equilibrium with Several Lobbies
  • 6. Summary
  • Appendix
  • Strict Majority Rule
  • References
  • 3. Competing for Endorsements
  • 1. The Literature on Political Endorsements
  • 2. The Model and a Benchmark
  • 3. A Neutrality Result
  • 4. Effective Endorsements
  • 4.1 Mechanical Endorsements
  • 4.2 Strategic Endorsements
  • 5 Welfare
  • 6 Conclusions
  • Appendix
  • Statement and Proof of Proposition 4
  • Proof of Proposition 5
  • References
  • Part II: Trade Policy
  • 4. Protection for Sale
  • 1. Overview
  • 2. Formal Framework
  • 3. The Structure of Protection
  • 4. Political Contributions
  • 5. Why Lobbies May Prefer Trade Policies
  • 6. Summary and Extensions
  • References
  • 5. Trade Wars and Trade Talks
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Model Outline and Relation to the Literature
  • 3. The Formal Model
  • 4. Trade Wars
  • 5. Trade Talks
  • 6. Conclusions
  • References
  • 6. Politics and Trade Policy
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Political Economy Approaches
  • 2.1 Direct Democracy
  • 2.2 Political Support Function
  • 2.3 Tariff-Formation Function
  • 2.4 Electoral Competition
  • 2.5 Influence-Driven Contributions
  • 3. Double-Edged Diplomacy
  • 3.1 Trade Wars
  • 3.2 Trade Talks
  • 3.3 Free Trade Agreements
  • References
  • 7. The Politics of Free Trade Agreements
  • 1 Analytical Framework
  • 1.1 Objectives of Economic and Political Agents
  • 1.2 The Political Game
  • 1.3 Economic Equilibria Under an FTA
  • 1.4 Effects of an FTA on Economic Interests
  • 2. Unilateral Stances
  • 3. Equilibrium Agreements
  • 4. Industry Exclusions
  • 4.1 Unilateral Stances
  • 4.2 Bargaining over Industry Exclusions
  • 5. Conclusions
  • Appendix
  • Contributions to Foreign Governments
  • References
  • 8. Foreign Investment with Endogenous Protection
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Basic Model
  • 2.1 Consumption and Production
  • 2.2 The Special Interest Group and the Government
  • 2.3 Multinationals
  • 3. DFI and Protection
  • 3.1 Tariff Response Curves
  • 3.2 Profit Differential Curves
  • 3.3 Entry

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