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|a 9781501751929
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|a 22573/ctvtzgwr6
|b JSTOR
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|a JC494
|b .D43 2020
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|a 321.09
|2 23
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|a UAMI
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1 |
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|a De Bruin, Erica,
|d 1982-
|e author.
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245 |
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|a How to prevent coups d'état :
|b counterbalancing and regime survival /
|c Erica De Bruin.
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|a Ithaca :
|b Cornell University Press,
|c 2020.
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|c ©2020
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|a 1 online resource (xiv, 199 pages) :
|b illustrations, maps
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
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|a online resource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
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|a Includes bibliographical references and index.
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|a Introduction: Preventing Coups d'état -- The Logic of Counterbalancing -- Counterbalancing and Coup Failure -- How Counterbalancing Works: Testing the Causal Mechanisms -- An Effective Deterrent? Counterbalancing and Coup Attempts -- Challenges to Building Coercive Institutions -- How Coups d'état Escalate to Civil War -- Conclusion: Coercive Institutions and Regime Survival.
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|a "In this book Erica De Bruin shows that how rulers design and organize their coercive institutions affects the survival of their regimes. Balancing the military with republican guards, secret police, and militia makes attempts to oust rulers more likely to fail. However, counterbalancing carries risks. When forces outside the regular military chain of command compete for arms and recruits, resentment among military officers can provoke coup attempts even as counterbalancing creates obstacles to a coup's execution."--
|c Provided by publisher.
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|a Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on October 21, 2020).
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|a JSTOR
|b Books at JSTOR Demand Driven Acquisitions (DDA)
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|a JSTOR
|b Books at JSTOR All Purchased
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|a JSTOR
|b Books at JSTOR Evidence Based Acquisitions
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|a Coups d'état
|x Prevention.
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|a Civil war
|x Prevention.
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|a Balance of power.
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|a Political leadership.
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|a Political stability.
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|a Military policy.
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|a Civil-military relations.
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|a National security.
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|a Équilibre des puissances.
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650 |
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|a Stabilité politique.
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|a Politique militaire.
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650 |
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|a Relations pouvoir civil-pouvoir militaire.
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650 |
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|a POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International)
|2 bisacsh
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650 |
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|a Balance of power
|2 fast
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Civil-military relations
|2 fast
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Military policy
|2 fast
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650 |
|
7 |
|a National security
|2 fast
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650 |
|
7 |
|a Political leadership
|2 fast
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650 |
|
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|a Political stability
|2 fast
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776 |
0 |
8 |
|i Print version:
|a De Bruin, Erica, 1982-
|t How to prevent coups d'état
|d Ithaca [New York] : Cornell University Press, 2020
|z 9781501751912
|w (DLC) 2020005767
|
856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://jstor.uam.elogim.com/stable/10.7591/j.ctvv413v6
|z Texto completo
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938 |
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|a ProQuest Ebook Central
|b EBLB
|n EBL6010763
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938 |
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|a YBP Library Services
|b YANK
|n 301625485
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938 |
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|a Project MUSE
|b MUSE
|n muse85325
|
938 |
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|a EBSCOhost
|b EBSC
|n 2439208
|
994 |
|
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|a 92
|b IZTAP
|