Unelected Power : the Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State /

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"Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politicall...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Tucker, Paul M. W., 1958- (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 2019.
Temas:
Banks and banking > State supervision.
Banking law.
Financial institutions > Government policy.
Monetary policy.
Banques > Contrôle de l'État.
Institutions financières > Politique gouvernementale.
Politique monétaire.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Government & Business.
Banking law
Banks and banking > State supervision
Financial institutions > Government policy
Monetary policy
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Frontmatter
  • Contents
  • Preface to the Paperback
  • Preface
  • 1. Introduction: Power, Welfare, Incentives, Values
  • PART I. Welfare: THE PROBLEM, AND A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
  • 2. The Evolution of the Administrative State
  • 3. The Purposes and Functional Modes of the Administrative State
  • 4. The Structure of the Administrative State
  • 5. Principles for Whether to Delegate to Independent Agencies
  • 6. Design Precepts for How to Delegate to Independent Agencies
  • 7. Applying the Principles for Delegation
  • PART II. Values: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY FOR INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
  • 8. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (1)
  • 9. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (2)
  • 10. Credible Commitment versus Democracy
  • 11. The Political- Values- and- Norms Robustness Test of the Principles for Delegation
  • 12. Insulated Agencies and Constitutionalism
  • PART III. Incentives: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE REAL WORLD: INCENTIVES AND VALUES UNDER DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES
  • 13. States' Capacity for Principled Delegation to Deliver Credible Commitment
  • 14. The Problem of Vague Objectives
  • 15. Processes, Transparency, and Accountability
  • 16. The Limits of Design
  • PART IV. Power: Overmighty Citizens? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL BANKING: POWER, LEGITIMACY, AND RECONSTRUCTION
  • 17. Central Banking and the Politics of Monetary Policy
  • 18. The Shift in Ideas
  • 19. Tempting the Gods
  • 20. A Money-Credit Constitution
  • 21. Central Banking and the Regulatory State
  • 22. Central Banking and the Fiscal State
  • 23. Central Banks and the Emergency State
  • 24. Overmighty Citizens After All?
  • Conclusion. Unelected Democrats
  • APPENDIX
  • ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
  • BIBLIOGRAPHY
  • INDEX

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