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|a UAMI
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|a Sen, Amartya,
|d 1933-
|e author.
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|a Collective choice and social welfare /
|c Amartya Sen.
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|a Expanded edition.
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|a Cambridge, Massachusetts :
|b Harvard University Press,
|c [2017]
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|a 1 online resource
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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|a computer
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|a online resource
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|a Print version record.
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|a "Original edition first published by Penguin Books Ltd, London"--Title page verso
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|a "First Harvard University Press edition, 2017"--Title page verso
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|a "Can the values which individual members of society attach to different alternatives be aggregated into values for society as a whole, in a way that is both fair and theoretically sound? Is the majority principle a workable rule for making decisions? How should income inequality be measured? When and how can we compare the distribution of welfare in different societies?" So reads the 1998 Nobel citation by the Swedish Academy, acknowledging Amartya Sen's important contributions in welfare economics and particularly his work in Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Originally published in 1970, this classic study has been recognized for its groundbreaking role in integrating economics and ethics, and for its influence in opening up new areas of research in social choice, including aggregative assessment. It has also had a large influence on international organizations, including the United Nations, notably in its work on human development. The book showed that the "impossibility theorems" in social choice theory--led by the pioneering work of Kenneth Arrow--do not negate the possibility of reasoned and democratic social choice. Sen's ideas about social choice, welfare economics, inequality, poverty, and human rights have continued to evolve since the book's first appearance. This expanded edition preserves the text of the original while presenting eleven new chapters of fresh arguments and results. Both the new and original chapters alternate between nonmathematical treatments of Sen's subjects, accessible to all, and mathematical arguments and proofs. A new introduction gives a far-reaching, up-to-date overview of the subject of social choice.--
|c Provided by publisher
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|a Includes bibliographical references (pages 491-566) and index.
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|a Preface (1970) -- New preface (2017) -- New introduction (2017) -- Collective choice and social welfare (1970). Introduction -- Preference relations -- Unanimity -- Collective choice rules and pareto comparisons -- Collective rationality -- Social welfare functions -- Choice versus orderings -- Social decision functions -- Values and choice -- Anonymity, neutrality and responsiveness -- Conflicts and dilemmas -- The liberal paradox -- Interpersonal aggregation and comparability -- Aggregation quasi-orderings -- Cardinality with or without comparability -- Bargains and social welfare functions -- Equity and justice -- Interpersonality and collective quasi-orderings -- Majority choice and related systems -- Restricted preferences and rational choice -- Theory and practice -- Collective choice and social welfare (2017). Enlightenment and impossibility -- Social preference -- Rationality and consistency -- Problems of social choice -- Justice and equity -- Social welfare evaluation -- Democracy and public engagement -- Votes and majorities -- The idea of rights -- Rights and social choice -- Reasoning and social decisions.
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|a JSTOR
|b Books at JSTOR All Purchased
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|a JSTOR
|b Books at JSTOR Demand Driven Acquisitions (DDA)
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|a Welfare economics.
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|a Social choice.
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|a Économie du bien-être.
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|a Choix collectif.
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|a POLITICAL SCIENCE
|x Essays.
|2 bisacsh
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|a POLITICAL SCIENCE
|x Government
|x General.
|2 bisacsh
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|a POLITICAL SCIENCE
|x Government
|x National.
|2 bisacsh
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|a POLITICAL SCIENCE
|x Reference.
|2 bisacsh
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|a Social choice.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst01122336
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650 |
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|a Welfare economics.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst01173620
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|a Wohlfahrtstheorie
|2 gnd
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|a Kollektiventscheidung
|2 gnd
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|a United States.
|0 (NL-LeOCL)078939836
|2 gtt
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|i Revision of:
|a Sen, Amartya, 1933-
|t Collective choice and social welfare.
|d San Francisco, Calif. : Holden-Day, [1970]
|z 0816277656
|w (DLC) 70114684
|w (OCoLC)140528
|
776 |
0 |
8 |
|i Print version:
|a Sen, Amartya, 1933-
|t Collective choice and social welfare.
|b Expanded edition.
|d Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, [2017]
|z 9780674971608
|z 0674971604
|w (DLC) 2016059434
|w (OCoLC)946907318
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|u https://jstor.uam.elogim.com/stable/10.2307/j.ctv2sp3dqx
|z Texto completo
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