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Agency Theory: Methodology, Analysis A Structured Approach to Writing Contracts

Designing a contract is often more of an economic than a legal problem. A good contract protects parties against opportunistic behavior while providing motivation to cooperate. This is where economics and, especially contract theory, may prove helpful by enhancing our understanding of incentive issu...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Stremitzer, Alexander (Autor)
Formato: Tesis Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Frankfurt a.M. Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften [2018], ©2005.
Edición:1st, New ed.
Colección:Free online access: JSTOR.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

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100 1 |a Stremitzer, Alexander.  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Agency Theory: Methodology, Analysis  |b A Structured Approach to Writing Contracts  |c Alexander Stremitzer. 
250 |a 1st, New ed. 
260 |a Frankfurt a.M.  |b Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften  |c [2018], ©2005. 
300 |a 1 online resource. 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a Forschungsergebnisse der Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien  |v 3. 
502 |a Thesis (Doctoral). 
505 0 |a Classic Risk-Incentive Trade-off -- Risk Sharing -- Error in Judgement -- Bankruptcy Constraints -- Transaction Costs -- Distortion -- Bonding -- Dynamic Extensions -- Income Smoothing -- Reputation Effects -- Career Concerns -- Epistemological Issues -- Sceptical Tradition -- Value of Axiomatic Approaches -- Methodological Individualism -- Methodology of Contract Theory -- Checklist for Drafting Contracts -- Programmatic Outlook. 
520 |a Designing a contract is often more of an economic than a legal problem. A good contract protects parties against opportunistic behavior while providing motivation to cooperate. This is where economics and, especially contract theory, may prove helpful by enhancing our understanding of incentive issues. The purpose of this book is to provide specific tools which will help to write better contracts in real world environments. Concentrating on moral hazard literature, this book derives a tentative checklist for drafting contracts. As an economic contribution to a field traditionally considered an art rather than a science, this treatment also gives much attention to methodological issues. 
545 0 |a The Author: Alexander Stremitzer, born in 1974. From 1994 to 2000 education in Business Administration, Law and Philosophy in Vienna and Paris. Experience in Consulting and Legislative Lobbying. Ph. D. 2003, currently Assistant Professor at the University of Bonn, Economics Department. 
588 0 |a Online resource; title from title screen (viewed December 28, 2018). 
590 |a JSTOR  |b Books at JSTOR All Purchased 
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650 0 |a Agency (Law) 
650 0 |a Contracts  |x Methodology. 
650 6 |a Contrats  |x Méthodologie. 
650 7 |a Agency (Law)  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00800198 
655 2 |a Academic Dissertation 
655 7 |a Academic theses.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01726453 
655 7 |a Academic theses.  |2 lcgft 
655 7 |a Thèses et écrits académiques.  |2 rvmgf 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |z 9783631529737 
830 0 |a Free online access: JSTOR. 
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994 |a 92  |b IZTAP