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Judge knot : politics and development in international investment law /
'Judge Knot' explores the biggest and the most controversial success story in international law: investor-state dispute settlement, or ISDS, and asks what makes the system tick and what it means for the future of democracy and development.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
London :
Anthem Press,
2018.
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| Colección: | Anthem frontiers of global political economy.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Front Matter; Half-title; Series information; Title page; Copyright information; Dedication; Table of contents; List of illustrations; Acknowledgments; Chapter Int-6; Introduction; References; Chapter One Entering the Judge Knot; All Tangled Up; From Jobs to Judges; Global Institutions Meet Democracy; Outline of Remaining Chapters; References; Chapter Two Historicizing Investment Law; Strengths and Weaknesses of International Relations Paradigms; Realism: Power Talks, Law Walks; Rational-Choice Institutionalism: Rules That Bind; Sociological Institutionalism: Doing What Is Right
- Historical Institutionalism: Taking Temporality SeriouslyJudicialization of Investment Law: A Historical Institutionalist Account; Critical Juncture: Challenge to Sovereign Immunity in the Peripheries and Proto-ISDS; Reactive Sequence: The Rights of Business After Social Upheavals; Incrementalism and Obfuscation: Congress as Frog in Boiling Water; Summing Up; References; Chapter Three Why Investors Demand Investment Law; Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The Mixed Empirical Track Record; What Do We Know about the Role of the State in Development?
- New Institutional Economics and Theories of State DevelopmentThe Institutionalist Political Economy Alternative; Role Reversal on Courts; Attractive Inputs: Arbitral Development Ideologies; What Types of State Behavior Are Investment Treaties Meant to Constrain?; How Should Policy Change?; What Role Do Treaties Play in National Development?; How Much Sensitivity Should Arbitrators Show States?; Attractive Outputs: Ideology in Arbitral Decisions; "Best" Case: Damages for Political Change; "Worst" Case: Damages Only for Changes Unfavorable to Foreigners
- "Best" (and "Worst") Case: All (or Only Part) of Tribunals Agree That Regulations' Impacts ... "Best" (and "Worst") Case: Foreigners Can Override Treaty Commitments of Their Home ... ; Truly Worst Case: Unusable Protections; Summing Up; References; Chapter Four Why Arbitrators Supply Investment Law; How Arbitrators Are Appointed; Arbitrator Types; Chairman Types; Wingman Types; Types in Interaction; Tribunal Types and Implications for States; Summing Up; References; Chapter Five Why Investment Law Lasts; Exploiting Imprecision; The Law Appliers; The Law Creators
- Benefiting from Complex DelegationScreening; Monitoring; Sanctions; Institutional Checks and Balances; How Viable Is Voice or Exit?; Summing Up; References; Chapter Six Toward Global Popular Constitutionalism; Law in Democracy: From Popular Constitutionalism to Judicial Supremacy in the United States; Three Tales of Judicialization; Labor: From More Judicialization to Less, and Back Again; Trade: From No to Lots of Judicialization; Tax: Selective Judicialization; Reforming Investment Law: Can Knotty Be Nice?; Global Popular Constitutionalism: A Roadmap; Complementary Policies