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Summa contra gentiles. Book two, Creation /
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés Latín |
| Publicado: |
Notre Dame IN :
University of Notre Dame Press,
1975.
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| Edición: | University of Notre Dame Press edition. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- The connection between the following considerations and the preceding ones
- That the consideration of creatures is useful for instruction of faith
- That knowledge of the nature of creatures serves to destroy errors concerning God
- That the philosopher and the theologian consider creatures in different ways
- Order of procedure
- That it is proper to God to be the source of the being of other things
- That active power exists in God
- That God's power is His substance
- That God's power is His action
- How power is attributed to God
- That something is said of God in relation to creatures
- That relations predicated of God in reference to creatures do not really exist in Him
- How the aforesaid relations are predicated of God
- That God is to all things the cause of being
- That God brought things into being from nothing
- That creation is neither motion nor change
- How objections against creation are solved
- That in creation no succession exists
- That no body is capable of creative action
- That the act of creating belongs to God alone
- That God is omnipotent
- That God does not act by natural necessity
- That God acts conformably to His wisdom
- How the omnipotent God is said to be incapable of certain things
- That the divine intellect is not confined to limited effects
- That the divine will is not restricted to certain effects
- How dueness is entailed in the production of things
- How absolute necessity can exist in created things
- That it is not necessary for creatures to have always existed
- Arguments of those who wish to demonstrate the world's eternity from the point of view of God
- Arguments of those who wish to prove the eternity of the world from the standpoint of creatures
- Arguments to prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of the making of things
- Solution of the foregoing arguments, and first of those taken from the standpoint of God
- Solution of the arguments proposed from the point of view of the things made
- Solution of the arguments taken from the point of view of the making of things
- Arguments by which some try to show that the world is not eternal
- That the distinction of things is not the result of chance
- That matter is not the first cause of the distinction of things
- That a contrariety of agents does not account for the distinction of things
- That the first cause of the distinction of things is not the world of secondary agents
- That the distinction of things is not caused by some secondary agent introducing diverse forms into matter
- That the distinction of things does not have its source in the diversity of merits or demerits
- The true first cause of the distinction of things
- That the perfection of the universe required the existence of some intellectual creatures
- That intellectual substances are endowed with will
- That intellectual substances have freedom of choice in acting
- That the intellectual substance is not a body
- That intellectual substances are immaterial
- That the intellectual substance is not a material form
- That in created intellectual substances, being and what is differ
- That in created intellectual substances there is act and potentiality
- That the composition of substance and being is not the same as the composition of matter and form
- That intellectual substances are incorruptible
- In what way an intellectual substance can be united to the body
- The position of Plato concerning the union of the intellectual soul with the body
- That in man there are not three souls, nutritive, sensitive, and intellective
- That man's possible intellect is not a separate substance
- That man derives his specific nature, not from the passive, but from the possible, intellect
- That this theory is contrary to the teaching of Aristotle
- Against Alexander's opinion concerning the possible intellect
- That the soul is not a temperament, as Galen maintained
- That the soul is not a harmony
- That the soul is not a body
- Against those who maintain that intellect and sense are the same
- Against those who hold that the possible intellect is the imagination
- How an intellectual substance can be the form of the body
- Solution of the arguments advanced above in order to show that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body as its form
- That according to the words of Aristotle the intellect must be said to be united to the body as its form
- That the soul is united to the body without intermediation
- That the whole soul is in the whole body and in each of its parts
- That there is not one possible intellect in all men
- Concerning the theory of Avicenna, who said that intelligible forms are not preserved in the possible intellect
- Solution of the seemingly demonstrative arguments for the unity of the possible intellect
- That the agent intellect is not a separate substance, but part of the soul
- That it is not impossible for the possible and agent intellect to exist together in the one substance of the soul
- That Aristotle held not that the agent intellect is a separate substance, but that it is a part of the soul
- That the human soul does not perish when the body is corrupted
- Arguments to prove that the corruption of the body entails that of the soul [and their solution]
- That the souls of brute animals are not immortal
- That the human soul begins to exist when the body does
- Solution of the preceding arguments
- That the soul is not made of God's substance
- That the human soul is not transmitted with the semen
- That the human soul is brought into being through the creative action of God
- Arguments designed to prove that the human soul is formed from the semen
- Solution of the preceding arguments
- That an intellectual substance is united only to a human body as its form
- That there are some intellectual substances which are not united to bodies
- Concerning the great number of separate substances
- Of the non-existence of a plurality of separate substances of one species
- That the separate substance and the soul are not of the same species
- How in separate substances genus and species are to be taken
- That separate substances do not receive their knowledge from sensible things
- That the intellect of a separate substance is always in act of understanding
- How one separate substance understands another
- That separate substances know material things
- That separate substances know singulars
- Whether separate substances have natural knowledge of all things at the same time.