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Competition for prisons : public or private? /

This book re-assesses the benefits and failures of competition, how public and private prisons compare, the impact of competition on the public sector's performance, and how well Government has managed this 'quasi-market'.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Le Vay, Julian (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Bristol : Policy Press, 2016.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Intro
  • COMPETITION FOR PRISONS
  • Contents
  • List of tables and figures
  • Tables
  • Figures
  • List of acronyms
  • Preface
  • 1. Origins
  • Prologue
  • The state of the prisons
  • Preparing the ground
  • The route to legislation
  • 2. Evolution
  • 1992-97: establishing a viable market
  • 1997-2000: Labour and the PFI boom
  • The 2000s: drift and indecision
  • 2010-15: Coalition government: the end of competition?
  • 3. Related markets: immigration
  • two sectors, no competition
  • A strange silence
  • Development of the immigration detention estate
  • A perfect market?
  • Comparing sectors
  • Conclusion
  • 4. Youth custody
  • Background
  • 1993-97 Conservative government and Secure Training Centres
  • 1997 onwards: Labour, expansion of the private sector and creation of the Youth Justice Board
  • Managing rising, then falling, demand
  • 2010 Coalition government
  • Competition?
  • Conclusion
  • 5. Related markets: electronic monitoring
  • fall of the giants
  • The fall
  • What did the contractors do wrong?
  • Why did they behave like this?
  • Impact
  • The untold half of the story
  • Why are these questions not being asked?
  • Non-barking watchdogs
  • So who is to blame?
  • 6. The quasi-market: characteristics and operation
  • Quasi-markets in public services
  • Scope and size of the quasi-market
  • The customer
  • Government's dual role: customer and competitor
  • Private sector view of government as customer
  • The private sector suppliers
  • Operation of the quasi-market
  • Conclusions
  • 7. Comparing public and contracted prisons
  • 8. Comparing quality of service
  • Methodological and data issues
  • Home Office studies of four 'management only' contracted prisons
  • National Audit Office study of the operational performance of PFI prisons
  • HM Inspectorate ratings
  • Statistical analysis by HMIP (2009)
  • NOMS Prison Rating System (PRS).
  • The Cambridge research
  • Comparison of quality at male local prisons
  • Prisons in trouble
  • Financial penalties
  • Conclusions
  • Four prisons in trouble
  • 9. Costing the uncostable? Civil Service pensions
  • The elephant in the room
  • The question
  • The Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme
  • Benchmarks
  • Does it really matter?
  • Conclusions
  • 10. Costing the uncostable? PFI
  • PFI in prisons
  • Criticisms of PSCs
  • Length of PFI contracts and value for money
  • Comparison with PFI in other services
  • The Mouchel study
  • Thameside PFI
  • The end of PFI
  • Conclusions
  • 11. Comparing cost
  • Some general issues about comparing costs
  • 'Management only' contracts (new builds)
  • Market tests
  • PFIs versus PSCs: the data
  • Construction: cost and speed
  • Structure of the difference in operational cost between sectors
  • Cost versus quality
  • Can the public sector match private sector costs?
  • Conclusions
  • 12. Impact of competition on the public sector
  • 1990: the Prison Service as basket case
  • Extent of improvement 1990-2010
  • What drove this improvement?
  • Scotland revisited
  • Innovation
  • Innovation in the contracted sector
  • Innovation in the public sector
  • Barriers to innovation
  • Conclusions
  • 13. Objections of principle
  • Bad in principle, or bad in practice?
  • 'Punishment is the preserve of the State'
  • What are the requirements for adequate control, accountability and transparency?
  • 'Immoral to make a profit out of suffering'
  • 'Driving increased incarceration'
  • Competition means a race to the bottom
  • What the public
  • and prisoners
  • think
  • The contrarian position: monopoly is immoral
  • Conclusions
  • 14. Related markets: probation
  • how not to do it
  • Seeing off competition
  • Kenneth Clarke's proposals, 2012
  • Grayling and 'Transforming Rehabilitation'
  • Proposed reinvestment.
  • Failure to cost programme
  • The organisational model for the new system is untried, over-complex and highly risky
  • Uncertainty and risk about PBR
  • Doubts about competence
  • Dealing with failure
  • Approach to risk
  • Comparison with competition in prisons
  • First inspection reports
  • Conclusion
  • 15. Has competition worked?
  • Has competition been worthwhile?
  • How well has government managed competition?
  • Mistakes, mis-steps and missed opportunities
  • 16. Has competition a future?
  • The end of competition?
  • No difference between sectors?
  • The new contractual model
  • Competition can be reintroduced at any time to deal with any failing public sector prison
  • Why competition matters
  • Conclusion
  • Wider reflections
  • Appendix: Prescription of operating procedures in prison contracts
  • Bibliography
  • Index.