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Industry influence in Federal regulatory agencies /

Federal regulatory agencies are often assumed to be excessively responsive to and influenced by the corporate interests they are supposed to regulate. On the basis of direct empirical examination, Paul Quirk challenges this assumption as it relates to four United States federal regulatory agencies....

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Quirk, Paul J., 1949- (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, [1981]
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

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100 1 |a Quirk, Paul J.,  |d 1949-  |e author. 
245 1 0 |a Industry influence in Federal regulatory agencies /  |c Paul J. Quirk. 
264 1 |a Princeton, New Jersey :  |b Princeton University Press,  |c [1981] 
264 4 |c ©1981 
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505 0 0 |t Frontmatter --  |t Contents --  |t List Of Tables --  |t Preface --  |t Chapter I. Introduction: The Problem of Industry Influence --  |t Chapter II. Research Strategy: A Study of Policy Incentives --  |t Chapter III. Policy Attitudes As Incentives: The Effects of Regulatory Appointments --  |t Chapter IV. The Budgetary Incentive --  |t Chapter V. Industry Jobs and The Career Incentive --  |t Conclusions and Implications --  |t Appendix A. List of Officials Interviewed --  |t Appendix B The Interview Schedule --  |t Appendix C. Comment On Coding --  |t Notes --  |t Bibliography --  |t Index. 
520 |a Federal regulatory agencies are often assumed to be excessively responsive to and influenced by the corporate interests they are supposed to regulate. On the basis of direct empirical examination, Paul Quirk challenges this assumption as it relates to four United States federal regulatory agencies. Through a series of interviews with high-level officials of the Federal Trade Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, he determines whether and what kinds of incentives exist to adopt policies favorable to industry. Originally published in 1981. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. 
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