Deterrence by diplomacy /

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"Why are countries often able to communicate critical information using diplomacy? Why do countries typically use diplomacy honestly, despite incentives to bluff? Why are they often able to deter attacks using merely verbal threats? International relations theory is largely pessimistic about th...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Sartori, Anne E., 1966-
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, [2005]
Temas:
Diplomacy.
Deterrence (Strategy)
Diplomatie.
Dissuasion (Stratégie)
diplomacy.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Government > International.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > International Relations > General.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > International Relations > Diplomacy.
Diplomacy
Diplomatie
Abschreckung
Diplomatieke betrekkingen.
Afschrikking (polemologie)
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • How bluffs can hurt a state's diplomacy, and honesty provides the ability to communicate
  • The failure of Chinese diplomacy, 1950
  • A reputational theory of diplomacy
  • Evidence that honesty matters
  • Reputations for honesty and the success of diplomacy
  • The broader importance of reputations for honesty
  • Appendix A : Characterization of the equilibrium
  • Appendix B : The impact of communication on war and on welfare
  • Appendix C : Implications of the theory
  • Appendix D : The effects of power status, contiguity, and democracy.

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