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049 |a UAMI 
100 1 |a Snyder, Jack L.,  |e author. 
245 1 4 |a The ideology of the offensive :  |b military decision making and the disasters of 1914 /  |c Jack Snyder. 
260 |a Ithaca, N.Y. :  |b Cornell University Press,  |c 1989, ©1984. 
300 |a 1 online resource (267 pages) :  |b illustrations 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a Cornell Studies in Security Affairs 
500 |a Includes index. 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
520 8 |a Annotation  |b Jack Snyder's analysis of the attitudes of military planners in the years prior to the Great War offers new insight into the tragic miscalculations of that era and into their possible parallels in present-day war planning. By 1914, the European military powers had adopted offensive military strategies even though there was considerable evidence to support the notion that much greater advantage lay with defensive strategies. The author argues that organizational biases inherent in military strategists' attitudes make war more likely by encouraging offensive postures even when the motive is self-defense. Drawing on new historical evidence of the specific circumstances surrounding French, German, and Russian strategic policy, Snyder demonstrates that it is not only rational analysis that determines strategic doctrine, but also the attitudes of military planners. Snyder argues that the use of rational calculation often falls victim to the pursuit of organizational interests such as autonomy, prestige, growth, and wealth. Furthermore, efforts to justify the preferred policy bring biases into strategists' decisionsbiases reflecting the influences of parochial interests and preconceptions, and those resulting from attempts to simplify unduly their analytical tasks. The frightening lesson here is that doctrines can be destabilizing even when weapons are not, because doctrine may be more responsive to the organizational needs of the military than to the implications of the prevailing weapons technology. By examining the historical failure of offensive doctrine, Jack Snyder makes a valuable contribution to the literature on the causes of war. 
505 0 0 |t Frontmatter --  |t Contents --  |t Illustrations --  |t Preface --  |t 1. Military Bias and Offensive Strategy --  |t 2. France: Offensive Strategy as an Institutional Defense --  |t 3. France: Du Picq, Dreyfus, and the Errors of Plan 17 --  |t 4. Germany: The Elusive Formula for Decisive Victory --  |t 5. Germany: The "Necessary" Is Possible --  |t 6. Russia: Bureaucratic Politics and Strategic Priorities --  |t 7. Russia: The Politics and Psychology of Overcommitment --  |t 8. The Determinants of Military Strategy --  |t Notes --  |t Selected Bibliography --  |t Index 
590 |a JSTOR  |b Books at JSTOR All Purchased 
590 |a JSTOR  |b Books at JSTOR Evidence Based Acquisitions 
590 |a JSTOR  |b Books at JSTOR Demand Driven Acquisitions (DDA) 
650 0 |a Offensive (Military science)  |x History  |y 20th century. 
650 0 |a Military planning  |z France  |x History  |y 20th century. 
650 0 |a Military planning  |z Germany  |x History  |y 20th century. 
650 0 |a Military planning  |z Soviet Union  |x History  |y 20th century. 
650 0 |a World War, 1914-1918  |x Campaigns. 
650 6 |a Attaque (Science militaire)  |x Histoire  |y 20e siècle. 
650 6 |a Planification militaire  |z France  |x Histoire  |y 20e siècle. 
650 6 |a Planification militaire  |z Allemagne  |x Histoire  |y 20e siècle. 
650 6 |a Planification militaire  |z URSS  |x Histoire  |y 20e siècle. 
650 6 |a Guerre mondiale, 1914-1918  |x Campagnes et batailles. 
650 7 |a HISTORY  |x Military  |x World War I.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a HISTORY  |x Military  |x Other.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING  |x Military Science.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a Military campaigns  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Military planning  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Offensive (Military science)  |2 fast 
651 7 |a France  |2 fast 
651 7 |a Germany  |2 fast 
651 7 |a Soviet Union  |2 fast 
647 7 |a World War  |d (1914-1918)  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01180746 
648 7 |a 1900-1999  |2 fast 
655 7 |a History  |2 fast 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Snyder, Jack.  |t Ideology of the Offensive : Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914.  |d Ithaca : Cornell University Press, ©1900  |z 9780801482441 
830 0 |a Cornell studies in security affairs. 
856 4 0 |u https://jstor.uam.elogim.com/stable/10.7591/j.ctt32b46j  |z Texto completo 
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