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Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Avoiding crises by creating norms
  • Narratives, dialogues, and signaling
  • Escalation management
  • Strategic stability
  • Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force
  • Introduction
  • Some hypothetical crises
  • Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis
  • States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis
  • A note on methodology
  • Purpose and organization
  • Avoiding crises by creating norms
  • What kind of norms might be useful?
  • Enforce laws against hacking
  • Disassociate from freelance hackers
  • Discourage commercial espionage
  • Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic
  • How do we enforce norms?
  • Confidence-building measures
  • Norms for victims of cyberattacks
  • Norms for war?
  • Deception
  • Military necessity and collateral damage
  • Proportionality
  • Reversibility
  • Conclusions
  • Narratives, dialogue, and signals
  • Narratives to promote control
  • A narrative framework for cyberspace
  • Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression
  • Victimization
  • Attribution
  • Retaliation
  • Aggression
  • Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis
  • We did nothing
  • Well, at least not on our orders
  • It was an accident
  • This is nothing new
  • At least it does not portend anything
  • Broader considerations
  • Signals
  • Ambiguity in signaling
  • Signaling resolve
  • Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat
  • Conclusions
  • Escalation management
  • Motives for escalation
  • Does escalation matter?
  • Escalation risks
  • Escalation risks in phase
  • Escalation risks for contained local conflicts
  • Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts
  • Managing proxy cyberattacks
  • What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation
  • Managing overt proxy conflict
  • The difficulties of tit-for-tat management
  • The importance of pre-planning
  • Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception
  • Inadvertent escalation
  • Escalation into kinetic warfare
  • Escalation into economic warfare
  • Sub rosa escalation
  • Managing the third-party problem
  • The need for a clean shot
  • Inference and narrative
  • Command and control
  • Commanders
  • Those they command
  • Conclusions
  • Implications for strategic stability
  • Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace
  • What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist?
  • Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities?
  • Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors?
  • Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles?
  • Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing?
  • Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing?
  • Misperception as a source of crisis
  • Side takes great exception to cyberespionage
  • Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war
  • Too much confidence in attribution
  • Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption
  • Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks
  • Neutrality
  • Conclusions
  • Can cyber crises be managed?
  • A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks
  • B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses
  • Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks?
  • Bibliography
  • Figures
  • Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative
  • Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat
  • Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation
  • Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks
  • Table
  • Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses.