|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
00000cam a2200000 i 4500 |
| 001 |
JSTOR_ocn818866398 |
| 003 |
OCoLC |
| 005 |
20231005004200.0 |
| 006 |
m o d |
| 007 |
cr ||||||||||| |
| 008 |
121119s2012 cau ob 000 0 eng |
| 010 |
|
|
|a 2012046778
|
| 040 |
|
|
|a DLC
|b eng
|e rda
|c DLC
|d OCLCF
|
| 019 |
|
|
|a 870962829
|a 889303188
|a 961658313
|a 1008953545
|a 1055355245
|a 1058069864
|a 1081246135
|a 1115102694
|a 1228593269
|
| 020 |
|
|
|a 9780833076809
|q (epub)
|
| 020 |
|
|
|a 0833076809
|
| 020 |
|
|
|a 9780833076816
|q (prc)
|
| 020 |
|
|
|a 0833076817
|
| 020 |
|
|
|a 9780833076793
|q ( ebook/pdf)
|
| 020 |
|
|
|a 0833076795
|
| 020 |
|
|
|z 9780833076786 (pbk. : alk. paper)
|
| 029 |
1 |
|
|a AU@
|b 000050186484
|
| 029 |
1 |
|
|a AU@
|b 000053309560
|
| 029 |
1 |
|
|a DEBBG
|b BV043036689
|
| 029 |
1 |
|
|a DEBBG
|b BV044062972
|
| 029 |
1 |
|
|a DEBSZ
|b 421231343
|
| 029 |
1 |
|
|a GBVCP
|b 1008657905
|
| 029 |
1 |
|
|a NZ1
|b 15590520
|
| 035 |
|
|
|a (OCoLC)818866398
|z (OCoLC)870962829
|z (OCoLC)889303188
|z (OCoLC)961658313
|z (OCoLC)1008953545
|z (OCoLC)1055355245
|z (OCoLC)1058069864
|z (OCoLC)1081246135
|z (OCoLC)1115102694
|z (OCoLC)1228593269
|
| 042 |
|
|
|a pcc
|
| 043 |
|
|
|a n-us---
|
| 050 |
0 |
0 |
|a U163
|
| 082 |
0 |
0 |
|a 358.4/141
|2 23
|
| 049 |
|
|
|a UAMI
|
| 100 |
1 |
|
|a Libicki, Martin C.
|
| 245 |
1 |
0 |
|a Crisis and escalation in cyberspace /
|c Martin C. Libicki.
|
| 264 |
|
1 |
|a Santa Monica, CA :
|b RAND,
|c [2012]
|
| 300 |
|
|
|a 1 online resource
|
| 336 |
|
|
|a text
|2 rdacontent
|
| 337 |
|
|
|a computer
|2 rdamedia
|
| 338 |
|
|
|a online resource
|2 rdacarrier
|
| 504 |
|
|
|a Includes bibliographical references.
|
| 505 |
0 |
|
|a Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses.
|
| 588 |
|
|
|a Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher.
|
| 590 |
|
|
|a JSTOR
|b Books at JSTOR Open Access
|
| 590 |
|
|
|a JSTOR
|b Books at JSTOR All Purchased
|
| 610 |
1 |
0 |
|a United States.
|b Air Force
|x Organization.
|
| 610 |
1 |
0 |
|a United States.
|b Air Force
|x Decision making.
|
| 610 |
1 |
7 |
|a United States.
|b Air Force.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst00538280
|
| 650 |
|
0 |
|a Information warfare
|z United States.
|
| 650 |
|
0 |
|a Escalation (Military science)
|
| 650 |
|
0 |
|a Cyberspace
|x Security measures.
|
| 650 |
|
0 |
|a Crisis management
|x Government policy
|z United States.
|
| 650 |
|
0 |
|a Cyberterrorism
|x Prevention.
|
| 650 |
|
0 |
|a Conflict management.
|
| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Armed Forces
|x Organization.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst01351846
|
| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Conflict management.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst00874778
|
| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Cyberspace
|x Security measures.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst02031378
|
| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Cyberterrorism
|x Prevention.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst01905567
|
| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Escalation (Military science)
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst00915107
|
| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Information warfare.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst00973186
|
| 651 |
|
7 |
|a United States.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst01204155
|
| 776 |
0 |
8 |
|i Print version:
|a Libicki, Martin C.
|t Crisis and escalation in cyberspace
|d Santa Monica, CA : RAND, [2012]
|z 9780833076786
|w (DLC) 2012046227
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://jstor.uam.elogim.com/stable/10.7249/j.ctt24hrx7
|z Texto completo
|
| 938 |
|
|
|a Books 24x7
|b B247
|n bkg00062868
|
| 938 |
|
|
|a EBL - Ebook Library
|b EBLB
|n EBL1365190
|
| 938 |
|
|
|a EBSCOhost
|b EBSC
|n 674641
|
| 938 |
|
|
|a YBP Library Services
|b YANK
|n 11090604
|
| 938 |
|
|
|a YBP Library Services
|b YANK
|n 11425108
|
| 994 |
|
|
|a 92
|b IZTAP
|
