Michael Collins and the Anglo-Irish War : Britain's counterinsurgency failure /

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As leader of the Irish Republican Brotherhood and then the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Michael Collins developed a bold, new strategy to use against the British administration of Ireland in the early twentieth century. His goal was to attack its well-established system of spies and informers, wear...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Hittle, J. B. E.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Washington, D.C. : Potomac Books, ©2011.
Edición:1st ed.
Temas:
Collins, Michael, > 1890-1922 > Military leadership.
Collins, Michael, > 1890-1922.
Collins, Michael > 1890-1922
Collins, Michael.
Irish Republican Army > History.
Great Britain. > Army > History > 20th century.
Grande-Bretagne. > Army > Histoire > 20e siècle.
Great Britain. > Army.
Irish Republican Army.
1900-1999
Revolutionaries > Ireland > Biography.
Insurgency > Ireland > History > 20th century.
Counterinsurgency > Ireland > History > 20th century.
Révolutionnaires > Irlande > Biographies.
Révoltes > Irlande > Histoire > 20e siècle.
Contre-rébellion > Irlande > Histoire > 20e siècle.
HISTORY > Europe > Ireland.
Counterinsurgency.
Insurgency.
Command of troops.
Revolutionaries.
Aufstand.
Ireland > History > War of Independence, 1919-1921.
Irlande > Histoire > 1919-1921 (Guerre d'indépendance)
Ireland.
Irland.
Irland > Aufstand (1920)
collective biographies.
Biographies.
History.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Descripción
Sumario:As leader of the Irish Republican Brotherhood and then the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Michael Collins developed a bold, new strategy to use against the British administration of Ireland in the early twentieth century. His goal was to attack its well-established system of spies and informers, wear down British forces with a sustained guerrilla campaign, and force a political settlement that would lead to a free Irish Republic. This book reveals that the success of the Irish insurgency was not just a measure of Collins's revolutionary genius, as has often been claimed. British miscalculations, overconfidence, and a failure to mount a sustained professional intelligence effort to neutralize the IRA contributed to Britain's defeat. The author takes a fresh approach to the subject, presenting it as a case study in intelligence management under conditions of a broader counterinsurgency campaign. The lessons learned from this disastrous episode have stark relevance for contemporary national security managers and warfighters currently engaged in the war on terrorism. --from book description, Amazon.com.
Descripción Física:1 online resource (xxv, 297 pages) : illustrations
Bibliografía:Includes bibliographical references (pages 283-288) and index.
ISBN:9781612341286
1612341284

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