The vulnerability thesis : interest group influence and institutional design /

Mostrar otras versiones (1)

Where politics is dominated by two large parties, as in the United States, politicians should be relatively immune to the influence of small groups. Yet narrow interest groups often win private benefits against majority preferences and at great public expense. Why? The "vulnerability thesis&quo...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Moosbrugger, Lorelei K. (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New Haven : Yale University Press, [2012]
Temas:
Pressure groups.
Majorities.
Representative government and representation.
Pressure groups > Case studies.
Majorities > Case studies.
Representative government and representation > Case studies.
Groupes de pression.
Majorité (Droit constitutionnel)
Gouvernement représentatif.
Groupes de pression > Études de cas.
Majorité (Droit constitutionnel) > Études de cas.
Gouvernement représentatif > Études de cas.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Political Process > Political Advocacy.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Government & Business.
Case studies.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Search Result 1
The vulnerability thesis : interest group influence and institutional design /
por Moosbrugger, Lorelei K.
Publicado 2012
Texto completo
Electrónico eBook
Mostrar todas las versiones(2)

Ejemplares similares