Lawlessness and economics : alternative modes of governance /

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How can property rights be protected and contracts be enforced in countries where the rule of law is ineffective or absent? How can firms from advanced market economies do business in such circumstances? In Lawlessness and Economics, Avinash Dixit examines the theory of private institutions that tra...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Dixit, Avinash K.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, ©2004.
Colección:Gorman lectures in economics.
Temas:
Economic policy.
Corporate governance.
Contracts.
Right of property.
Corporation law.
Business enterprises > Law and legislation.
International cooperation.
Corporate governance > Developing countries.
Contracts > Developing countries.
Right of property > Developing countries.
Corporation law > Developing countries.
Business enterprises > Law and legislation > Developing countries.
Politique économique.
Gouvernement d'entreprise.
Contrats.
Droit de propriété.
Coopération internationale.
contracts.
property rights.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Economics > Theory.
Developing countries > Economic policy.
Developing countries.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover; Lawlessness and Economics; The Gorman Lectures in Economics; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Lawlessness and Economics; 1 Economics With and Without the Law; 1.1 The Need for Economic Governance; 1.2 Economics Taking the Law for Granted; 1.3 "Lawlessness and Economics" in Context; 1.4 Law and Economics; 1.5 Economics in the Shadow of the Law; 1.6 Other Institutions of Economic Governance; 1.7 Some Basic Analytical Apparatus; 1.8 Approach of the Book; 2 Private Ordering in the Shadow of the Law; 2.1 Issues and Empirical Research; 2.2 Bargaining When the Law is a Backstop
  • 2.3 Relational and Formal Contracts2.4 Arbitration and Information; 2.5 Assessment and Prospects; 2.6 Mathematical Appendix; 3 Relation-Based Contract Enforcement; 3.1 Issues and Empirical Research; 3.2 Relation-Based and Rule-Based Governance; 3.3 Limits of Relation-Based Governance; 3.4 Related Theoretical Models; 3.5 Assessment and Prospects; 3.6 Mathematical Appendix; 4 Profit-Motivated Contract Enforcement; 4.1 Issues and Empirical Research; 4.2 The Structure of the Model; 4.3 Information Intermediaries; 4.4 Enforcement Intermediaries; 4.5 Assessment and Prospects
  • 4.6 Mathematical Appendix5 Private Protection of Property Rights; 5.1 Issues and Empirical Research; 5.2 Production and Protection under Anarchy; 5.3 For-Profit Private Protection; 5.4 A Predatory State and Its Citizens; 5.5 Assessment and Prospects; 5.6 Mathematical Appendix; 6 Conclusion; 6.1 Implications for Institutions and Policies; 6.2 Implications for Future Research; References; Index

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