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The Populist Paradox : Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation.

Do small but wealthy interest groups influence referendums, ballot initiatives, and other forms of direct legislation at the expense of the broader public interest? Many observers argue that they do, often lamenting that direct legislation has, paradoxically, been captured by the very same wealthy i...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Gerber, Elisabeth R.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2011.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

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100 1 |a Gerber, Elisabeth R. 
245 1 4 |a The Populist Paradox :  |b Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation. 
260 |a Princeton :  |b Princeton University Press,  |c 2011. 
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505 0 |a Cover; THE POPULIST PARADOX; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; Acknowledgments; 1. What Is the Populist Paradox?; A Theory of Interest Group Influence; Motivation: The Study of Interest Group Influence; Justification: Why Study Direct Legislation?; Plan of the Book; 2. Interest Group Choice; Forms of Influence; Interest Group Choice; Achieving Influence; Summary and Conclusions; 3. Direct Legislation Hurdles; Achieving Direct Modifying Influence; Achieving Direct Preserving Influence; Achieving Indirect Modifying Influence. 
505 8 |a Achieving Indirect Preserving Influence: Opposing anInitiative to Signal the LegislatureBehavioral Hurdles; Summary and Conclusions; 4. Group Characteristics and Resources; Monetary and Personnel Resources; Using Resources to Overcome Hurdles; Membership Characteristics; Classifying Groups and Their Resources; Hypotheses about Motivations and Forms of Influence; Summary; 5. Motivations and Strategies; Methodology; What Do Groups Say They Do?; What Do Groups Actually Do?; Summary and Conclusions; 6. Direct Policy Consequences; Direct Policy Consequences; Summary and Conclusions. 
505 8 |a 7. Indirect Policy ConsequencesState Policy Differences; Summary and Conclusions; 8. The Populist Paradox: Reality or Illusion?; Economic Group Limitations; Citizen Group Dominance; Implications for the Study of Direct Legislation; Implications for the Study of Interest Group Influence; Positive versus Normative Implications; A Final Assessment; Appendixes; A. Direct Legislation Institutions; B. Survey of Organizations; References; Index. 
520 |a Do small but wealthy interest groups influence referendums, ballot initiatives, and other forms of direct legislation at the expense of the broader public interest? Many observers argue that they do, often lamenting that direct legislation has, paradoxically, been captured by the very same wealthy interests whose power it was designed to curb. Elisabeth Gerber, however, challenges that argument. In this first systematic study of how money and interest group power actually affect direct legislation, she reveals that big spending does not necessarily mean big influence. Gerber bases her findings. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
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590 |a JSTOR  |b Books at JSTOR All Purchased 
590 |a JSTOR  |b Books at JSTOR Evidence Based Acquisitions 
650 0 |a Pressure groups  |z United States. 
650 0 |a Referendum  |z United States. 
650 0 |a Referendum. 
650 6 |a Référendum  |z États-Unis. 
650 6 |a Référendum. 
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650 7 |a POLITICAL SCIENCE  |x Political Process  |x General.  |2 bisacsh 
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650 7 |a Referendum  |2 fast 
651 7 |a United States  |2 fast 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Gerber, Elisabeth R.  |t Populist Paradox : Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation.  |d Princeton : Princeton University Press, ©2011  |z 9780691002675 
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