Prosecutors in the boardroom : using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct /

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Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companie...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Otros Autores: Barkow, Anthony S., Barkow, Rachel E.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York : New York University Press, ©2011.
Colección:NYU series in social and cultural analysis.
Temas:
Corporation law > United States > Criminal provisions.
Prosecution > United States.
Poursuites judiciaires > États-Unis.
LAW > Criminal Law > General.
LAW > Corporate.
Corporation law > Criminal provisions.
Prosecution.
United States.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Introduction / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow
  • The causes of corporate crime : an economic perspective / Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A. Cohen
  • Deferred prosecution agreements on trial : lessons from the law of unconstitutional conditions / Richard A. Epstein
  • Removing prosecutors from the boardroom : limiting prosecutorial discretion to impose structural reforms / Jennifer Arlen
  • Potentially perverse effects of corporate civil liability / Samuel W. Buell
  • Inside-out enforcement / Lisa Kern Griffin
  • The institutional logic of preventive crime / Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar
  • Collaborative organizational prosecution / Brandon L. Garrett
  • The prosecutor as regulatory agency / Rachel E. Barkow
  • What are the rules if everybody wants to play? multiple federal and state prosecutors (acting) as regulators / Sara Sun Beale
  • Reforming the corporate monitor? / Vikramaditya Khanna
  • Conclusion / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow.

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