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Game theory evolving : a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction /
This revised edition contains new material & shows students how to apply game theory to model human behaviour in ways that reflect the special nature of sociality & individuality. It continues its in-depth look at cooperation in teams, agent-based simulations, experimental economics, & t...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Princeton :
Princeton University Press,
©2009.
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| Edición: | 2nd ed. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Preface; 1 Probability Theory; 1.1 Basic Set Theory and Mathematical Notation; 1.2 Probability Spaces; 1.3 De Morgan's Laws; 1.4 Interocitors; 1.5 The Direct Evaluation of Probabilities; 1.6 Probability as Frequency; 1.7 Craps; 1.8 A Marksman Contest; 1.9 Sampling; 1.10 Aces Up; 1.11 Permutations; 1.12 Combinations and Sampling; 1.13 Mechanical Defects; 1.14 Mass Defection; 1.15 House Rules; 1.16 The Addition Rule for Probabilities; 1.17 A Guessing Game; 1.18 North Island, South Island; 1.19 Conditional Probability; 1.20 Bayes' Rule; 1.21 Extrasensory Perception.
- 1.22 Les Cinq Tiroirs1.23 Drug Testing; 1.24 Color Blindness; 1.25 Urns; 1.26 The Monty Hall Game; 1.27 The Logic of Murder and Abuse; 1.28 The Principle of Insufficient Reason; 1.29 The Greens and the Blacks; 1.30 The Brain and Kidney Problem; 1.31 The Value of Eyewitness Testimony; 1.32 When Weakness Is Strength; 1.33 The Uniform Distribution; 1.34 Laplace's Law of Succession; 1.35 From Uniform to Exponential; 2 Bayesian Decision Theory; 2.1 The Rational Actor Model; 2.2 Time Consistency and Exponential Discounting; 2.3 The Expected Utility Principle.
- 2.4 Risk and the Shape of the Utility Function2.5 The Scientific Status of the Rational Actor Model; 3 Game Theory: Basic Concepts; 3.1 Big John and Little John; 3.2 The Extensive Form; 3.3 The Normal Form; 3.4 Mixed Strategies; 3.5 Nash Equilibrium; 3.6 The Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory; 3.7 Solving for Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria; 3.8 Throwing Fingers; 3.9 Battle of the Sexes; 3.10 The Hawk-Dove Game; 3.11 The Prisoner's Dilemma; 4 Eliminating Dominated Strategies; 4.1 Dominated Strategies; 4.2 Backward Induction; 4.3 Exercises in Eliminating Dominated Strategies.
- 4.4 Subgame Perfection4.5 Stackelberg Leadership; 4.6 The Second-Price Auction; 4.7 The Mystery of Kidnapping; 4.8 The Eviction Notice; 4.9 Hagar's Battles; 4.10 Military Strategy; 4.11 The Dr. Strangelove Game; 4.12 Strategic Voting; 4.13 Nuisance Suits; 4.14 An Armaments Game; 4.15 Football Strategy; 4.16 Poker with Bluffing; 4.17 The Little Miss Muffet Game; 4.18 Cooperation with Overlapping Generations; 4.19 Dominance-Solvable Games; 4.20 Agent-based Modeling; 4.21 Why Play a Nash Equilibrium?; 4.22 Modeling the Finitely-Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma; 4.23 Review of Basic Concepts.
- 5 Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria5.1 Price Matching as Tacit Collusion; 5.2 Competition on Main Street; 5.3 Markets as Disciplining Devices: Allied Widgets; 5.4 The Tobacco Market; 5.5 The Klingons and the Snarks; 5.6 Chess: The Trivial Pastime; 5.7 No-Draw, High-Low Poker; 5.8 An Agent-based Model of No-Draw, High-Low Poker; 5.9 The Truth Game; 5.10 The Rubinstein Bargaining Model; 5.11 Bargaining with Heterogeneous Impatience; 5.12 Bargaining with One Outside Option; 5.13 Bargaining with Dual Outside Options; 5.14 Huey, Dewey, and Louie Split a Dollar; 5.15 Twin Sisters.