Cargando…

Game theory evolving : a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction /

This revised edition contains new material & shows students how to apply game theory to model human behaviour in ways that reflect the special nature of sociality & individuality. It continues its in-depth look at cooperation in teams, agent-based simulations, experimental economics, & t...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Gintis, Herbert
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton : Princeton University Press, ©2009.
Edición:2nd ed.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a2200000Ia 4500
001 JSTOR_ocn659563512
003 OCoLC
005 20231005004200.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu---unuuu
008 100830s2009 njua ob 001 0 eng d
010 |a  2008036523 
040 |a N$T  |b eng  |e pn  |c N$T  |d IDEBK  |d YDXCP  |d OCLCQ  |d CDX  |d E7B  |d CHRRO  |d OCLCQ  |d REDDC  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCF  |d OCLCQ  |d OTZ  |d OCLCQ  |d AU@  |d OCLCQ  |d U3W  |d JSTOR  |d OCLCO  |d UKAHL  |d UX1  |d VT2  |d DEGRU  |d EBLCP  |d MHW  |d DEBSZ  |d MERUC  |d S2H  |d ORZ  |d VHC  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO 
015 |a GBA919719  |2 bnb 
016 7 |a 014915365  |2 Uk 
019 |a 609852844  |a 642475682  |a 717550736  |a 748092649  |a 755038840  |a 816388636  |a 994928884  |a 1129181500  |a 1175622502  |a 1228607124  |a 1262674443  |a 1303424019 
020 |a 9781400830077  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 1400830079  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 0691140510  |q (paper ;  |q alk. paper) 
020 |a 9780691140513  |q (paper ;  |q alk. paper) 
020 |a 0691140502  |q (cloth ;  |q alk. paper) 
020 |a 9780691140506  |q (cloth ;  |q alk. paper) 
020 |a 1282608118 
020 |a 9781282608115 
020 |a 9786612608117 
020 |a 6612608110 
024 7 |a 10.1515/9781400830077  |2 doi 
029 1 |a AU@  |b 000056812634 
029 1 |a CDX  |b 13614096 
029 1 |a CHRRO  |b R005537823 
029 1 |a AU@  |b 000066259221 
029 1 |a DEBSZ  |b 445984945 
029 1 |a AU@  |b 000073144234 
035 |a (OCoLC)659563512  |z (OCoLC)609852844  |z (OCoLC)642475682  |z (OCoLC)717550736  |z (OCoLC)748092649  |z (OCoLC)755038840  |z (OCoLC)816388636  |z (OCoLC)994928884  |z (OCoLC)1129181500  |z (OCoLC)1175622502  |z (OCoLC)1228607124  |z (OCoLC)1262674443  |z (OCoLC)1303424019 
037 |a 260811  |b MIL 
037 |a 22573/ctvckv5dv  |b JSTOR 
050 4 |a HB144  |b .G56 2009eb 
072 7 |a BUS  |x 069030  |2 bisacsh 
072 7 |a s1se  |2 rero 
072 7 |a BUS  |x 069000  |2 bisacsh 
072 7 |a MAT  |x 011000  |2 bisacsh 
072 7 |a SCI  |x 008000  |2 bisacsh 
072 7 |a PBUD  |2 bicssc 
082 0 4 |a 330.01/5193  |2 22 
084 |a QH 430  |2 rvk 
084 |a SK 860  |2 rvk 
049 |a UAMI 
100 1 |a Gintis, Herbert. 
245 1 0 |a Game theory evolving :  |b a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction /  |c Herbert Gintis. 
250 |a 2nd ed. 
260 |a Princeton :  |b Princeton University Press,  |c ©2009. 
300 |a 1 online resource (xvii, 390 pages) :  |b illustrations 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
347 |a text file 
347 |b PDF 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 375-383) and index. 
520 8 |a This revised edition contains new material & shows students how to apply game theory to model human behaviour in ways that reflect the special nature of sociality & individuality. It continues its in-depth look at cooperation in teams, agent-based simulations, experimental economics, & the evolution & diffusion of preferences. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
505 0 |a Preface; 1 Probability Theory; 1.1 Basic Set Theory and Mathematical Notation; 1.2 Probability Spaces; 1.3 De Morgan's Laws; 1.4 Interocitors; 1.5 The Direct Evaluation of Probabilities; 1.6 Probability as Frequency; 1.7 Craps; 1.8 A Marksman Contest; 1.9 Sampling; 1.10 Aces Up; 1.11 Permutations; 1.12 Combinations and Sampling; 1.13 Mechanical Defects; 1.14 Mass Defection; 1.15 House Rules; 1.16 The Addition Rule for Probabilities; 1.17 A Guessing Game; 1.18 North Island, South Island; 1.19 Conditional Probability; 1.20 Bayes' Rule; 1.21 Extrasensory Perception. 
505 8 |a 1.22 Les Cinq Tiroirs1.23 Drug Testing; 1.24 Color Blindness; 1.25 Urns; 1.26 The Monty Hall Game; 1.27 The Logic of Murder and Abuse; 1.28 The Principle of Insufficient Reason; 1.29 The Greens and the Blacks; 1.30 The Brain and Kidney Problem; 1.31 The Value of Eyewitness Testimony; 1.32 When Weakness Is Strength; 1.33 The Uniform Distribution; 1.34 Laplace's Law of Succession; 1.35 From Uniform to Exponential; 2 Bayesian Decision Theory; 2.1 The Rational Actor Model; 2.2 Time Consistency and Exponential Discounting; 2.3 The Expected Utility Principle. 
505 8 |a 2.4 Risk and the Shape of the Utility Function2.5 The Scientific Status of the Rational Actor Model; 3 Game Theory: Basic Concepts; 3.1 Big John and Little John; 3.2 The Extensive Form; 3.3 The Normal Form; 3.4 Mixed Strategies; 3.5 Nash Equilibrium; 3.6 The Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory; 3.7 Solving for Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria; 3.8 Throwing Fingers; 3.9 Battle of the Sexes; 3.10 The Hawk-Dove Game; 3.11 The Prisoner's Dilemma; 4 Eliminating Dominated Strategies; 4.1 Dominated Strategies; 4.2 Backward Induction; 4.3 Exercises in Eliminating Dominated Strategies. 
505 8 |a 4.4 Subgame Perfection4.5 Stackelberg Leadership; 4.6 The Second-Price Auction; 4.7 The Mystery of Kidnapping; 4.8 The Eviction Notice; 4.9 Hagar's Battles; 4.10 Military Strategy; 4.11 The Dr. Strangelove Game; 4.12 Strategic Voting; 4.13 Nuisance Suits; 4.14 An Armaments Game; 4.15 Football Strategy; 4.16 Poker with Bluffing; 4.17 The Little Miss Muffet Game; 4.18 Cooperation with Overlapping Generations; 4.19 Dominance-Solvable Games; 4.20 Agent-based Modeling; 4.21 Why Play a Nash Equilibrium?; 4.22 Modeling the Finitely-Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma; 4.23 Review of Basic Concepts. 
505 8 |a 5 Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria5.1 Price Matching as Tacit Collusion; 5.2 Competition on Main Street; 5.3 Markets as Disciplining Devices: Allied Widgets; 5.4 The Tobacco Market; 5.5 The Klingons and the Snarks; 5.6 Chess: The Trivial Pastime; 5.7 No-Draw, High-Low Poker; 5.8 An Agent-based Model of No-Draw, High-Low Poker; 5.9 The Truth Game; 5.10 The Rubinstein Bargaining Model; 5.11 Bargaining with Heterogeneous Impatience; 5.12 Bargaining with One Outside Option; 5.13 Bargaining with Dual Outside Options; 5.14 Huey, Dewey, and Louie Split a Dollar; 5.15 Twin Sisters. 
546 |a In English. 
590 |a JSTOR  |b Books at JSTOR Demand Driven Acquisitions (DDA) 
590 |a JSTOR  |b Books at JSTOR All Purchased 
590 |a JSTOR  |b Books at JSTOR Evidence Based Acquisitions 
650 0 |a Game theory. 
650 0 |a Economics, Mathematical. 
650 2 |a Game Theory 
650 6 |a Théorie des jeux. 
650 7 |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS  |x Economics  |x Theory.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a Economics, Mathematical  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Game theory  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Spieltheorie  |2 gnd 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Gintis, Herbert.  |t Game theory evolving.  |b 2nd ed.  |d Princeton : Princeton University Press, ©2009  |z 9780691140513  |w (DLC) 2008036523  |w (OCoLC)244177303 
856 4 0 |u https://jstor.uam.elogim.com/stable/10.2307/j.ctvcm4gjh  |z Texto completo 
938 |a Askews and Holts Library Services  |b ASKH  |n AH26387535 
938 |a Coutts Information Services  |b COUT  |n 13614096 
938 |a ebrary  |b EBRY  |n ebr10392628 
938 |a EBSCOhost  |b EBSC  |n 329726 
938 |a ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection  |b IDEB  |n 260811 
938 |a YBP Library Services  |b YANK  |n 3168253 
938 |a De Gruyter  |b DEGR  |n 9781400830077 
938 |a EBL - Ebook Library  |b EBLB  |n EBL475860 
994 |a 92  |b IZTAP