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Mathematics and democracy : designing better voting and fair-division procedures /
Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathe...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Princeton, N.J. :
Princeton University Press,
©2008.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Electing a single winner : approval voting in practice
- Electing a single winner : approval voting in theory
- Electing a single winner : combining approval and preference
- Electing multiple winners : constrained approval voting
- Electing multiple winners : the minimax procedure
- Electing multiple winners : minimizing misrepresentation
- Selecting winners in multiple elections
- Selecting a governing coalition in a parliament
- Allocating cabinet ministries in a parliament
- Allocating indivisible goods : help the worst-off or avoid envy?
- Allocating a single homogeneous divisible good : divide-the-dollar
- Allocating multiple homogeneous divisible goods : adjusted winner
- Allocating a single heterogeneous good : cutting a cake
- Allocating divisible and indivisible goods
- Summary and conclusions.