The Tet offensive : intelligence failure in war /

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"In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in American history, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing on Vietcong and recently...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Wirtz, James J., 1958-
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1991.
Colección:Cornell studies in security affairs.
Temas:
1961-1975
Tet Offensive, 1968.
Vietnam War, 1961-1975 > Military intelligence.
Vietnam War, 1961-1975 > United States.
Têt, Offensive du, 1968.
Guerre du Viêt-nam, 1961-1975 > Service des renseignements militaires.
HISTORY > Asia > Southeast Asia.
HISTORY > Military > Vietnam War.
Military intelligence.
Tet-offensief.
United States.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • PART 1. "THE BIG VICTORY, THE GREAT TASK": 1. The Communist debate over strategy ; 2. Plans, preparations, and objectives of the Tet Offensive
  • PART 2. THE ORIGINS OF SURPRISE: 3. The sources of American biases ; 4. Missing the signals: July-November 1967 ; 5. Missing the signals: December 1967-30 January 1968 ; 6. Reacting to the Tet Offensive
  • Conclusion: Explaining the failure of intelligence.

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