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Practical reason, Aristotle, and weakness of the will /
Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will was first published in 1984. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. One of the central problem...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Minneapolis :
University of Minnesota Press,
©1984.
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| Colección: | Minnesota publications in the humanities ;
v. 4. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Acknowledgments; Introduction; Part One: Practical Reason and Aristotle; Chapter 1 A Statement of the Problem; Section I: The Nature of Practical Reason; Section II: The Scope of Practical Reason; Section III: Does Aristotle's Ethics Rest on Practical Reason?; Chapter 2 Aristotle and Hume: A Preliminary Contrast; Section I: Action as a Result of Appetite; Section II: Action as a Result of Desire and Deliberation; Section III: The Practical Syllogism; Section IV: A Preliminary Contrast; Chapter 3 Reason and General Ends; Section I: Reason Apprehends the Ends of Action
- Section II: Universal Ends Acquired by Induction: The Role of Nous in Practical AffairsSection III: Apprehending vs. Acquiring Ends; Section IV: A Sketch of a Theory; Section V: Objections; Chapter 4 The Pervasiveness of Aristotle's Views on Practical Reason; Section I: Practical Wisdom and Virtue; Section II: Excellence in Deliberation; Section III: Nature and the End of Action (NE 1114b16-25); Section IV: Aristotle's Methodology in Ethics and Politics; Chapter 5 The Apparent Support for the Humean Position; Section I: Deliberation Is about Means
- Section II: Virtue Preserves First PrinciplesSection III: Phronēsis Provides One with the Right Means, Aretē with the Right Ends; Chapter 6 A Summary of the Argument; Chapter 7 The Interest of Aristotle's Position on Practical Reason: Happiness and the Good Relative to Human Beings; Section I: Happiness as the End of Action; Section II: The Good as Fulfilling the Ergon of Human Beings Well; Section III: The Good for Human Beings and the Good Human Being: Their Connection; Chapter 8 Does Aristotle's Position on Practical Reason Provide an Adequate Basis for Ethics?
- Section I: Initial ObjectionsSection II: The Incompleteness of Aristotle's Position; Section III: Objectivity Once More; Part Two: Aristotle and Weakness of the Will; Chapter 9 The Traditional Interpretation: Some Problems and Preliminaries; Section I: The Traditional Interpretation; Section II: Some Problems for the Traditional Interpretation; Section III: The Seriousness of These Problems; Section IV: Variations of the Traditional Interpretation; Section V: A Methodological Problem; Chapter 10 An Argument for the Traditional Interpretation; Section I: A Thesis about Knowledge and Action
- Section II: Aristotle's General Approach to AkrasiaSection III: The Details of Aristotle's Explanation of Akrasia; Section IV: Solutions to the Problems Raised for the Traditional Interpretation; Section V: A Summary of the Argument; Chapter 11 An Argument for an Alternative Interpretation; Section I: Conflicts of Motive and Akrasia; Section II: The Thesis about Knowledge and Action Reconsidered; Section III: Aristotle's General Approach to Akrasia; Section IV: The Details of Aristotle's Explanation of Akrasia; Section V: Two Final Objections; Section VI: A Summary; Concluding Remarks