Doctrine of eternal recurrence : the U.S. military and counterinsurgency doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006 /

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This paper tests and ultimately disproves the assumption that doctrine as written and operations as conducted are tightly linked. Ingrained organizational concepts and beliefs have a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Long, Austin G.
Autor Corporativo: United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Santa Monica, CA : Rand National Defense Research Institute, 2008.
Colección:Rand counterinsurgency study. Paper ; 6.
Occasional paper (Rand Corporation) ; OP-200-OSD.
Temas:
Counterinsurgency > United States.
Military doctrine > United States.
Contre-rébellion > États-Unis.
Doctrines militaires > États-Unis.
HISTORY > Revolutionary.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Security (National & International)
Counterinsurgency.
Military doctrine.
United States.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover; Preface; Contents; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence-The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine; Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: Defining the Terms; Small Wars Before COIN: U.S. Experiences Prior to 1960; The Kennedy Years: The Birth of COIN Doctrine; Limits of Doctrine: Vietnam, 1961 to 1963; Attempts to Put Doctrine into Practice: The PROVN Study, 1965 to 1966; COIN as Practiced: Vietnam, 1965 to 1968; Doctrine in the Late 1960s; COIN as Practiced: Vietnam, 1969 to 1972; Interlude: COIN and the Military, 1973 to 2003
  • COIN Doctrine, 2003 to 2005COIN Operations, 2003 to 2005; Doctrine and Operations in 2006; Getting It Right? COIN in Iraq, 2007; Komer's Lament: COIN Doctrine vs. COIN Practice; Conclusion; References

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