Military realism : the logic and limits of force and innovation in the US Army /

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"After the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army considered counterinsurgency (COIN) a mistake to be avoided. Many found it surprising, then, when setbacks in recent conflicts led the same army to adopt a COIN doctrine. Scholarly debates have primarily employed existing theories of military bureaucracy or...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Campbell, Peter P. (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Columbia, Missouri : University of Missouri Press, [2019]
Colección:American military experience series.
Temas:
1900-2099
Military doctrine > United States > History > 20th century.
Military doctrine > United States > History > 21st century.
Doctrines militaires > États-Unis > Histoire > 20e siècle.
Doctrines militaires > États-Unis > Histoire > 21e siècle.
HISTORY > Military > Strategy.
HISTORY > Military > United States.
HISTORY > Military > Other.
TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING > Military Science.
Military doctrine
Military policy
United States > Military policy.
United States
History
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Military Realism
  • Flexible Response, the Nuclear Battlefield, and Counterinsurgency: Kennedy and Army Doctrine in the 1960s
  • Army Doctrine in the Shadow of Vietnam: Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 1968
  • From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Cold War Doctrine of the '70s and '80s
  • The Power Projection Army: Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era until the Eve of September 11
  • Transforming under Fire: The Global War on Terror, Counterinsurgency, Iraq, and Operations 2008.

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