Cargando…

The Origin of Oughtness : a Case for Metaethical Conativism /

How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Fischer, Stefan (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Berlin ; Boston : De Gruyter, [2018]
Colección:Practical Philosophy ; volume 22
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a2200000Mi 4500
001 EBSCO_on1049627104
003 OCoLC
005 20231017213018.0
006 m o d
007 cr |||||||||||
008 180821t20182018gw fob z001 0 eng d
040 |a DEGRU  |b eng  |e rda  |e pn  |c DEGRU  |d YDX  |d N$T  |d EBLCP  |d OCLCF  |d YDX  |d OCLCQ  |d UKAHL  |d OCLCQ  |d K6U  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCQ  |d DEGRU 
019 |a 1048944897  |a 1049858992 
020 |a 9783110599855  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 3110599856  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 9783110599787  |q (electronic book) 
020 |a 3110599783  |q (electronic book) 
020 |z 9783110599251 
020 |z 3110599252 
020 |z 3110600722 
020 |z 9783110600728 
024 7 |a 10.1515/9783110599787  |2 doi 
035 |a (OCoLC)1049627104  |z (OCoLC)1048944897  |z (OCoLC)1049858992 
050 4 |a BJ1012  |b .F57 2018 
072 7 |a PHI005000  |2 bisacsh 
072 7 |a PHI016000  |2 bisacsh 
072 7 |a PHI  |x 009000  |2 bisacsh 
072 7 |a PHI  |x 016000  |2 bisacsh 
082 0 4 |a 170  |2 23 
049 |a UAMI 
100 1 |a Fischer, Stefan,  |e author. 
245 1 4 |a The Origin of Oughtness :  |b a Case for Metaethical Conativism /  |c Stefan Fischer. 
264 1 |a Berlin ;  |a Boston :  |b De Gruyter,  |c [2018] 
264 4 |c ©2018 
300 |a 1 online resource (297 pages) 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
347 |a text file  |b PDF  |2 rda 
490 0 |a Practical Philosophy ;  |v volume 22 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
505 0 0 |t Frontmatter --  |t Preface and acknowledgments --  |t Contents --  |t Part i: the phenomenon and how to explain it --  |t 1 the phenomenon of oughtness --  |t 2 the grounds for explaining oughtness --  |t 3 two angles and a dialectical dead end --  |t Part ii: four theories of oughtness --  |t 4 stemmer's humean theory of oughtness --  |t 5 halbig's value realism --  |t 6 schroeder's hypotheticalism --  |t 7 scanlon's reasons fundamentalism --  |t 8 why humeanism 'wins' --  |t Part iii: constructing conativism --  |t 9 a look ahead --  |t 10 an anthropological framework for humeanism --  |t 11 the argument from favored desires --  |t 12 the nature of desiring --  |t 13 promoting desires --  |t 14 idealization, epistemic error, and autonomy --  |t 15 the nature of practical reasons --  |t 16 the weight of favorings --  |t 17 conativism and the morality angle --  |t 18 the origin of oughtness: a recapitulation --  |t Bibliography --  |t Index. 
520 |a How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff she judges essential, but the opponents do not think this to be a major flaw. In an attempt to meet the problem of gridlock head-on, the current investigation approaches oughtness differently. I start with the introduction of a grounding framework for thinking about oughtness that allows a lucid presentation of the views on the market. It soon becomes clear that one necessary part of any plausible assessment of accounts of oughtness is a discussion of their adequacy conditions. I continue with a detailed evaluation of four different accounts, as presented by Halbig (2007), Schroeder (2007), Stemmer (2006), and Scanlon (2014). My main result is that desire-based or Humean theories of oughtness are more plausible because desire-independent accounts fail to explain something crucial: the for-me character of oughtness. Based on the insights gathered thus far, I then develop a new Humean theory - metaethical conativism - and defend it against some historically influential objections. 
546 |a In English. 
588 0 |a Online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 21. Aug 2018). 
590 |a eBooks on EBSCOhost  |b EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide 
650 0 |a Metaethics. 
650 6 |a Métaéthique. 
650 7 |a PHILOSOPHY  |x History & Surveys  |x General.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a PHILOSOPHY  |x History & Surveys  |x Modern.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a Metaethics.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01894559 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |z 9783110599251 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |z 9783110600728 
856 4 0 |u https://ebsco.uam.elogim.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1868109  |z Texto completo 
938 |a Askews and Holts Library Services  |b ASKH  |n AH34024048 
938 |a Askews and Holts Library Services  |b ASKH  |n AH36184667 
938 |a De Gruyter  |b DEGR  |n 9783110599787 
938 |a ProQuest Ebook Central  |b EBLB  |n EBL5521650 
938 |a EBSCOhost  |b EBSC  |n 1868109 
938 |a YBP Library Services  |b YANK  |n 15647293 
938 |a YBP Library Services  |b YANK  |n 15146785 
994 |a 92  |b IZTAP