The implementation of anti-BEPS rules in the EU : a comprehensive study /

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Providing a comprehensive technical analysis of the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, this book also offers insight on selected issues connected with the OECD BEPS Project.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Otros Autores: Pistone, Pasquale (Editor ), Weber, D. M. (Dennis Manolito), 1970- (Editor )
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Amsterdam : IBFD, [2018]
Temas:
Taxation > Law and legislation.
LAW > Military.
Taxation > Law and legislation
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Intro
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Table of Contents
  • Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive and the Implementation of the BEPS Project in the European Union
  • 1.1. Scope, research question and methodology
  • 1.2. Part One: The Anti-Tax Avoidance Package and its impact on European tax law and policy in the era of global tax law
  • 1.3. Part Two: The ATAD
  • 1.3.1. General remarks
  • 1.3.2. ATAD measures fully implementing BEPS Actions in the European Union
  • 1.3.3. Implementation of the BEPS Project through the ATAD and other EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Package measures
  • 1.3.4. Other content of the ATAD
  • Part One: The Anti-BEPS Package, its Impact on European Tax Law and Policy in the Era of Global Tax Law
  • Chapter 2: The BEPS Project: Still a Military Approach
  • 2.1. Introduction
  • 2.2. The rise of the Strategic Plan: The BEPS Action Plan
  • 2.3. Defining battlefronts: The Actions for addressing BEPS
  • 2.3.1. Action 1: Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy
  • 2.3.2. Action 2: Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements
  • 2.3.3. Action 3: Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules
  • 2.3.4. Action 4: Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments
  • 2.3.5. Action 5: Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance
  • 2.3.6. Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances
  • 2.3.7. Action 7: Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status
  • 2.3.8. Actions 8-10: Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation
  • 2.3.9. Action 11: Establish Methodologies to Collect and Analyse Data on BEPS and the Actions to Address It
  • 2.3.10. Action 12: Require Taxpayers to Disclose Their Aggressive Tax Planning Arrangements.
  • 2.3.11. Action 13: Re-examine Transfer Pricing Documentation
  • 2.3.12. Action 14: Make Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective
  • 2.3.13. Action 15: Develop a Multilateral Instrument
  • 2.4. Conclusion: From antagonism to cooperation
  • Chapter 3: EU-US Relations in the Field of Direct Taxes from the EU Perspective: A BEPS-Induced Transformation?
  • 3.1. Introduction
  • 3.2. The traditional framework of EU tax competence
  • 3.3. EU anti-BEPS rules concerning the United States: Exhausting the European Union's tax competence?
  • 3.3.1. EU anti-BEPS rules with particular importance for third countries
  • 3.3.2. Fundamental freedoms, EU competence, and anti-BEPS rules
  • 3.4. EU State aid investigations and the US response: A transformation of the European Union's tax competence?
  • 3.4.1. State aid investigation as a tool to push for harmonization
  • 3.4.2. The US reaction to expanded State aid enforcement in direct taxation
  • 3.5. A fundamental transformation of EU-US relations from the multilateral to the bilateral level?
  • 3.5.1. Does the European Union's external competence encompass double taxation agreements?
  • 3.5.2. What is the impact of the European Union's external competence on existing bilateral double tax agreements (DTAs)?
  • 3.6. Summary and conclusion
  • Chapter 4: The EU-US Relationship in the Field of Income Taxation as Viewed from a US Perspective
  • 4.1. Introduction
  • 4.2. Backstory: Check-the-box as a Rashomon problem
  • 4.3. The OECD BEPS Project and the EC State aid cases
  • 4.4. What might be next?
  • 4.5. Final words
  • Chapter 5: BEPS, 3D Printing and the Evolution of the Manufacturing Industry
  • 5.1. Introduction
  • 5.2. What is the digital economy?
  • 5.2.1. The digital economy and BEPS
  • 5.2.2. Looking forward: 3D printing
  • 5.2.3. What is 3D printing?
  • 5.2.4. How does 3D printing work?
  • 5.2.5. Changes to classic manufacturing models and possible benefits
  • 5.2.6. Taxation issues
  • 5.2.7. Who owns a product's IP?
  • 5.2.7.1. PE exposure
  • 5.3. Indirect taxes
  • 5.4. Conclusion
  • Chapter 6: Patent Boxes before and after BEPS Action 5
  • 6.1. Patent boxes before BEPS
  • 6.1.1. France, Ireland and the other pioneers
  • 6.1.2. 2006-2008: The Commission's scrutiny of the Irish and Spanish regimes
  • 6.1.3. A new European spring for patent boxes
  • 6.2. 2014-2015, a year of changes: OECD BEPS Action 5 and the modified nexus approach
  • 6.2.1. The Code of Conduct dilemma and the OECD BEPS Action 5 discussions
  • 6.2.2. The nexus approach and the Germany-UK agreement
  • 6.2.3. October 2015: Final Report
  • 6.3. Patent boxes after BEPS
  • 6.3.1. The work of the Code of Conduct Group on the MNA
  • 6.3.2. The implementation of the modified nexus approach by EU Member States
  • 6.3.3. Third countries
  • 6.4. Conclusions
  • Chapter 7: Tax Planning and State Aid
  • 7.1. Introduction
  • 7.2. The substantive State aid framework in a nutshell
  • 7.3. State aid and transfer pricing: The Starbucks and Apple cases
  • 7.4. State aid and tax treaty relief: The McDonald's case
  • 7.5. Final remarks
  • Chapter 8: BEPS Action 6 and the LOB Provision: Restoring the Debate on the Compatibility with EU Law
  • 8.1. Introduction
  • 8.2. OECD BEPS Action 6
  • 8.2.1. Overview
  • 8.2.2. The proposed LOB provision
  • 8.3. LOB provisions and EU law
  • 8.3.1. Relation between tax treaties and EU law
  • 8.3.2. ECJ case law
  • 8.3.2.1. ECJ case law on anti-abuse rules
  • 8.3.2.2. Relevant ECJ case law for LOB provisions
  • 8.3.2.2.1. Factortame 2
  • 8.3.2.2.2. Commission volume Netherlands
  • 8.3.2.2.3. Open Skies
  • 8.3.2.2.4. ACT GLO
  • 8.3.3. The Commission's position on the LOB
  • 8.3.3.1. In general
  • 8.3.3.2. The LOB provision in the Japan-Netherlands tax treaty.
  • 8.3.3.3. The Commission's views on the proposed Action 6 LOB clause
  • 8.3.3.4. Assessing the LOB provision against EU law
  • 8.4. Conclusions
  • Chapter 9: The Switch-Over Clause: To Exempt or Not to Exempt, That Is the Question
  • 9.1. Introduction
  • 9.2. Purpose and background of the switch-over clause
  • 9.2.1. Introduction
  • 9.2.2. The Code of Conduct Group
  • 9.2.3. The 2011 draft CCCTB proposal
  • 9.2.4. The ATAD proposal
  • 9.2.5. The ATAD Presidency compromise text
  • 9.3. The proposed provisions in the 2016 C(C)CTB proposals
  • 9.4. Issues regarding the application and interpretation of the clause
  • 9.4.1. Striking differences with the ATAD Presidency compromise text
  • 9.4.2. The tax rate test
  • 9.4.3. The need for an active business escape
  • 9.4.4. The scope of the tax treaty escape
  • 9.4.5. PEs and the scope of the switch-over clause: The mystery of article 54
  • 9.5. Credit method
  • 9.6. Losses
  • 9.7. Appraisal of the switch-over clause
  • 9.8. Epilogue
  • Chapter 10: BEPS Action 12: The Lack of Certainty and the Infringement of Taxpayers' Rights
  • 10.1. Introduction
  • 10.2. Action 12: The lack of definition of "aggressive tax planning" infringes taxpayers' rights
  • 10.2.1. Overview of the recommendations in Action 12
  • 10.2.2. Criticisms: Uncertainty and infringement of taxpayers' rights
  • 10.2.2.1. How should tax avoidance schemes be defined?
  • 10.2.2.2. Violation of the rights to privacy and confidentiality
  • 10.2.2.3. Self-incrimination risk
  • 10.3. In search of cooperation or obedience?
  • 10.4. Mexico: Consequences of early implementation
  • 10.4.1. Article 31-A of the Federal Tax Code
  • 10.4.2. Deviations from Action 12 recommendations on the implementation of the Mexican norm and the unconstitutional result
  • 10.5. Conclusions.
  • Chapter 11: The Transitional Period and its Impact on Tax Competition and the Implementation of the BEPS Project
  • 11.1. The realization of the potential of the BEPS package depends on coordinated, consistent, coherent, clear, honest and effective implementation
  • 11.1.1. The value of the inclusive OECD/G20 BEPS package
  • 11.1.2. Prioritization of the implementation of the BEPS package
  • 11.1.3. The transitional period is a broad concept
  • 11.2. The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Package (especially the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive) setting a model example for the implementation of the BEPS package across the globe
  • 11.2.1. Responsible and coordinated implementation required by interlocking memberships of the OECD, European Union and G20
  • 11.2.2. The June Action Plan of 2015
  • 11.2.3. The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Package
  • 11.2.4. The ATAD as a global flagship
  • 11.2.5. The impact of the ATAD's transposition period on the implementation of the OECD/G20 BEPS package
  • 11.3. The prospective (rather than retrospective) nature of the BEPS package
  • 11.3.1. The interchangeable usage of "retroactivity" and "retrospectivity"
  • 11.3.2. The policy of international instruments on the retroactivity/retrospectivity of criminal law
  • 11.3.3. The general prohibition of retroactivity/retrospectivity of law in major jurisdictions
  • 11.3.4. The emerging exceptional trend of retroactivity/retrospectivity of domestic tax law
  • 11.3.5. The pros and cons of exceptional retroactive/retrospective tax legislation
  • 11.3.6. Exceptional retroactive/retrospective tax legislation does not justify ex post facto actions of the BEPS package
  • 11.4. Legal predictability, certainty and better compliance demand a reasonable transitional period in the course of the implementation of the BEPS package
  • 11.4.1. The yellow-light interval analogy.

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