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Corporate governance in contention /
This book debates the meaning and purpose of corporate governance in advanced countries today. The issues discussed centre on relationships within the firm e.g. between labour, managers, and investors, and relationships outside the firm that affect consumers or the environment.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Otros Autores: | , |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Oxford, United Kingdom :
Oxford University Press,
2018.
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| Edición: | First edition. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Corporate Governance in Contention; Copyright; Acknowledgements; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Acronyms; List of Contributors; 1: Corporate Governance and Why It Matters; 1.1 WHERE WE ARE; 1.2 WHAT IS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?; 1.3 SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY: FINANCE IS THE KEY INPUT; 1.3.1 Shareholder Primacy: Enterprise, Collective Engagement and Politics; 1.4 STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT: FINANCE IS NOT THE ONLY INPUT; 1.4.1 Stakeholder Involvement: Enterprise; Collective Engagement; Politics; 1.5 THE CHAPTERS IN OUTLINE; REFERENCES
- Part 1: Corporate Forms and the Law2: Reversing Financialization: Shareholder Value and the Legal Reform of Corporate Governance; 2.1 INTRODUCTION; 2.2 THE LEGAL MODEL OF THE FIRM; 2.3 ELEVATING THE SHAREHOLDER INTEREST: HOSTILE TAKEOVERS, HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES; 2.4 CAN LEGAL REFORMS REVERSE FINANCIALIZATION?; 2.5 CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; 3: Protecting Long-term Commitment: Legal and Organizational Means; 3.1 INTRODUCTION; 3.2 SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: CO-OPERATIVES AND COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES; 3.2.1 Co-operatives; 3.2.1.1 Problems with the Co-operative Model
- 3.2.2 New Legal Forms for SE3.2.2.1 Problems with the CIC Model; 3.2.3 For-profit Companies; 3.2.3.1 Statement of Purpose; 3.2.3.2 Certification; 3.2.3.3 Share Rights; 3.2.3.4 Multi-Class Share Rights Structures; 3.2.4 Profit-with-Purpose Companies (PPCs); 3.2.4.1 Definition of a Collective Purpose; 3.2.4.2 Shareholder Commitment towards Purpose; 3.2.4.3 Accountability and Assessment Standards; 3.2.4.4 Control Mechanisms; 3.3 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS; REFERENCES; Online resources; 4: Foundation Ownership and Firm Performance: A Review of the International Evidence; 4.1 OVERVIEW
- 4.2 WHAT ARE INDUSTRIAL FOUNDATIONS?4.3 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS; 4.4 EMPIRICAL PERFORMANCE STUDIES; 4.4.1 Denmark; 4.4.2 Sweden; 4.4.3 Norway; 4.4.4 Germany; 4.4.5 Austria; 4.4.6 Switzerland; 4.4.7 The USA; 4.4.8 The UK; 4.4.9 France; 4.4.10 The Netherlands; 4.4.11 Italy; 4.4.12 India; 4.4.13 Taiwan; 4.5 CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; 5: Corporate Governance and Family-owned Companies: The Case of BHS; 5.1 INTRODUCTION; 5.2 BACKGROUND TO BHS; 5.3 CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS; 5.3.1 Corporate Structure; 5.3.2 Board of Directors; 5.4 SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION; 5.4.1 Dividends
- 5.4.2 Property Transactions5.4.3 Related Party Loans; 5.5 PENSION SCHEME; 5.6 AUDITORS; 5.7 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION; REFERENCES; Part II: Corporate Governance Systems and Innovation; 6: The Functions of the Stock Market and the Fallacies of Shareholder Value; 6.1 WHAT DOES THE STOCK MARKET DO?; 6.2 THE CONTROL FUNCTION, INNOVATIVE ENTERPRISE, AND US ECONOMIC GROWTH; 6.3 THE FIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE STOCK MARKET; 6.4 THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STOCK MARKET AS INFLUENCES ON THE CREATION-EXTRACTION RELATION; 6.4.1 Control: From 'Retain-and-Reinvest' to 'Downsize-and-Distribute'