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What truth is /
Mark Jago offers a new metaphysical account of truth. He argues that to be true is to be made true by the existence of a suitable worldly entity. Truth arises as a relation between a proposition - the content of our sayings, thoughts, beliefs, and so on - and an entity (or entities) in the world.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Oxford, United Kingdom :
Oxford University Press,
2018.
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| Edición: | First edition. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; What Truth Is; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgements; Introduction; The Nature of Truth; Which Approach: Metaphysical or Logical?; Realism and Anti-Realism; Outline of the Book; Chapter 1: Substantial or Insubstantial?; Chapter 2: Arguments for Truthmaking; Chapter 3: Truthmaker Maximalism; Chapter 4: States of Affairs; Chapter 5: Everything and Nothing; Chapter 6: Truthmaking and Grounding; Chapter 7: The Logic of Truthmaking; Chapter 8: The Nature of Propositions; Chapter 9: Dealing with Liars; Notation; I: Truth and Making True; 1: Truth: Substantial orInsubstantial?
- 1.1 Deflationism1.2 Deflationism with Propositions; 1.3 The Identity Problem; 1.4 Paradox; 1.5 Pluralism about Truth; 1.6 Alethic Pluralism and Generic Truth; 1.7 Going Substantial; 1.8 Chapter Summary; 2: Arguments for Truthmaking; 2.1 Why Truthmaking?; 2.2 Catching Cheats; 2.3 Grounding; 2.4 From Ways to Properties; 2.5 States of Affairs; 2.6 States of Affairs as Truthmakers; 2.7 Truth as Truthmaking; 2.8 Chapter Summary; 3: Truthmaker Maximalism; 3.1 Maximalism and Non-Maximalism; 3.2 Arguments for Maximalism; 3.3 The Non-Maximalist Account; 3.4 The Maximalist Strikes Back.
- 3.5 Non-Maximalist Replies3.6 Maximalism Across the Board; 3.7 Chapter Summary; II: Truthmakers; 4: States of Affairs; 4.1 The Fundamental Tie Account; 4.2 The Primitivist Account; 4.3 The Mereological Account; 4.4 Comparing the Approaches; 4.5 Chapter Summary; 5: Everything and Nothing; 5.1 Maximalism and Necessitation (Again); 5.2 Maximalism with Ordinary Entities; 5.3 The Whole World; Option 4: The World, Essentially As It Is; Option 5: Truthmaker Monism; 5.4 Totality States of Affairs; 5.5 Negative States of Affairs; 5.6 The Nature of the Negative; The Fundamental Tie Account.
- The Primitivist AccountThe Mereological Account; 5.7 More Tough Cases; Modal Truths; Counterfactual Truths; Analytic Truths; Temporal Truths; 5.8 Chapter Summary; III: The Truthmaking Relation; 6: Truthmaking and Grounding; 6.1 Can Truthmaking Be Defined?; 6.2 Truthmaking and Necessity; 6.3 Truthmaking and Grounding; 6.4 Grounding Grounding and Grounding Truthmaking; 6.5 Reflexivity, Symmetry, Transitivity; 6.6 Chapter Summary; 7: The Logic of Truthmaking; 7.1 Truthmaker Semantics; 7.2 Truthmaking, Exact and Inexact; 7.3 Exact Truthmaking; 7.4 Exact Entailment; 7.5 Inexact Truthmaking.
- 7.6 Chapter SummaryIV: Propositions and Paradoxes; 8: The Nature of Propositions; 8.1 Roles for Propositions; 8.2 The Nature of Propositions; 8.3 Sets of Possible Worlds; 8.4 Structured Propositions; 8.5 Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions; 8.6 What are Merely Possible States of Affairs?; 8.7 Same-Saying and Aboutness; 8.8 Chapter Summary; 9: Dealing with Liars; 9.1 The Liar; 9.2 The Liar's Revenge; 9.3 Embracing Contradictions; 9.4 The Non-Contractive Approach; 9.5 Other Substructural Approaches; 9.6 Restricting The T-scheme; 9.7 The Undecidability Approach; 9.8 The No Proposition Approach.