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Cycles and social choice : the true and unabridged story of a most protean paradox /
This book illuminates the sources and consequences of cycles and instability in the mathematical theory of voting and social choice.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2018.
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Schwartz, Thomas, |d 1943- |e author. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Cycles and social choice : |b the true and unabridged story of a most protean paradox / |c Thomas Schwartz, University of California, Los Angeles. |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge : |b Cambridge University Press, |c 2018. | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
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| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed March 5, 2018). | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Cover; Half-title page; Title page; Copyright page; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgements; Introduction; 1 Condorcet's Two Discoveries; 1.1 The Rejection of Condorcet Winners; 1.2 The Paradox of Voting; 1.3 What the Paradox Means and Does Not; 1.4 Why Majorities: May's Theorem; 1.5 More than Cycles: McGarvey's Theorem; 1.6 Beyond Majority Rule: Ward's Theorem; 1.7 Individual Rights: Sen's Paradox; 1.8 A Word about Words; 2 Incidence of the Paradox; 2.1 Black's Median-Stability Theorem; 2.2 Generalizations of Single Peakedness | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 2.3 More Dimensions and 360 Degree Medianhood: Cox's Theorem2.4 Pairwise Symmetry: Plott's Theorem; 2.5 Default Stability and a Side Trip beyond Majority Rule; 2.6 Essential Packaging; 2.7 Contrasts and Limitations, or Purging Preposterous Premises; 2.8 Observable Evidence of Cycles; 3 Social Rationality; 3.1 Choice Functions and Rationality; 3.2 Rationality and the Classical Framework of Social Choice; 3.3 Arrow's Theorem; 3.4 On interpreting and Misinterpreting the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives; 3.5 Proof of Arrow's Theorem; 3.6 On Not Overstating the Theorem | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 4 Arrovian Cycle Theorems4.1 First Relaxation: Transitive Social Preference; 4.2 From »-Transitivity to Acyclicity, Assuming n Alternatives; 4.3 Wrong Turn: Positive Responsiveness; 4.4 Three or More Alternatives and a Reasonable Limit on Ties: (2k -- 2)-Resoluteness; 4.5 A Side Trip to Interpersonally Comparable Cardinal Utilities; 4.6 Proof of Inconsistency; 5 Second Line of Cycle Theorems: Condorcet Generalizations; 5.1 Simple Latin-Square Constructions: The Theorems of Ward, Brown, and Nakamura; 5.2 A General Condition for Cycles; 5.3 Proof that Cycles are Allowed | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 5.4 How Earlier Results and Proofs Fit the Pattern5.5 Individual Indifference and the Most General Cycle-Sufficiency Condition of All; 5.6 The Necessity Theorem; 6 Top Cycles in a Fixed Feasible Set; 6.1 New Bottle, Old Wines; 6.2 Top Cycles; 6.3 Tricycles and All-Inclusive Tight Cycles; 6.4 Absorbing Old Assumptions; 7 Strategic Consequences of Cycles; 7.1 Vote Manipulation; 7.2 Proof that Cycles Ensure Manipulability, and a Slight Generalization; 7.3 Comparison with Other Theorems; 7.4 Consequences of Nonmanipulability proved: The Duggan-Schwartz Theorem; 7.5 Cycles and Game Solutions | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 7.6 Proof that Cycles Block Nash Implementation8 Structural Consequences of Cycles; 8.1 Agenda Control: Trees; 8.2 Dendriform Details; 8.3 Agenda Control: Sets; 8.4 Agenda Control: Joining and Dividing Questions; 8.5 Cycles and Paradoxical Power; 8.6 Cycles, External Costs, and Political Parties; 9 Questions about Prediction and Explanation; 9.1 What Majorities Would Choose; 9.2 Proof that (1)-(4) Characterize TEQ; 9.3 Examples and Comparisons of TEQ with Other Solutions; 9.4 A Different Approach to Cooperative Solutions; 9.5 Beyond Tournaments; 9.6 Methodological Asides: The Use of Axioms | |
| 520 | |a This book illuminates the sources and consequences of cycles and instability in the mathematical theory of voting and social choice. | ||
| 590 | |a eBooks on EBSCOhost |b EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Voting |x Mathematical models. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Social choice. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Vote |x Modèles mathématiques. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Choix collectif. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE |x Government |x General. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE |x Political Process |x Elections. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE |x Political Process |x General. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Social choice. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01122336 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Voting |x Mathematical models. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01169244 | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Schwartz, Thomas, 1943- |t Cycles and social choice. |d Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2018 |z 1107180910 |z 9781107180918 |w (DLC) 2017052586 |w (OCoLC)1011557275 |
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