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Probabilistic knowledge /

Sarah Moss argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. She introduces the notion of probabilistic content and shows how it plays a central role not only in epistemology, but in the philosophy of mind and language. Just you can believe and assert propositions, you can...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Moss, Sarah (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

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245 1 0 |a Probabilistic knowledge /  |c Sarah Moss. 
264 1 |a Oxford :  |b Oxford University Press,  |c 2018. 
300 |a 1 online resource 
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504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
588 0 |a Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed February 19, 2018). 
505 0 |a Cover; Probabilistic Knowledge; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface; 1: The case for probabilistic contents; 1.1 Probabilistic beliefs; 1.2 An argument for probabilistic contents of belief; 1.3 The roles played by contents of belief; 1.4 Full beliefs; 1.5 Alternative roles for contents of belief; 2: The case for probabilistic assertion; 2.1 Familiar arguments against propositional contents of assertion; 2.2 Foundational arguments for probabilistic contents of assertion; 2.3 Modeling communication; 2.4 Epistemic modals and indicative conditionals. 
505 8 |a 2.5 A test battery for probabilistic content3: Epistemic modals and probability operators; 3.1 Motivations for my semantics; 3.2 Embedded epistemic vocabulary; 3.3 Challenges for other theories; 3.4 A semantics for epistemic modals and probability operators; 3.5 A semantics for simple sentences; 3.6 The relationship between credence and full belief; 4: Indicative conditionals; 4.1 Probabilities of conditionals as conditional probabilities; 4.2 A semantics for conditionals; 4.3 Why probabilities of conditionals are not conditional probabilities; 4.4 A semantics for other logical operators. 
505 8 |a 4.5 The pragmatics of epistemic vocabulary5: The case for probabilistic knowledge; 5.1 The thesis that probabilistic beliefs can be knowledge; 5.2 Testimony; 5.3 Perception; 5.4 Arguments for probabilistic contents of experience; 5.5 Other sources of knowledge; 5.6 Justified true belief without knowledge; 5.7 Traditional theories of knowledge; 5.8 An alternative mental state?; 5.9 Applications; 6: Factivity; 6.1 Alternatives to probabilistic knowledge?; 6.2 The contents of knowledge ascriptions; 6.3 Frequently asked questions; 6.4 Relativism; 6.5 Objective chance; 7: Skepticism. 
505 8 |a 7.1 A skeptical puzzle7.2 The argument from inconsistency; 7.3 The argument from closure; 7.4 The argument from disjunction; 7.5 The argument from safety; 8: Knowledge and belief; 8.1 The knowledge norm of belief; 8.2 Peer disagreement; 8.3 Applying the knowledge norm of belief; 8.4 Statistical inference; 8.5 Responses to skepticism about perceptual knowledge; 9: Knowledge and action; 9.1 Knowledge norms of action; 9.2 Addressing objections; 9.3 Applying knowledge norms of action; 9.4 Pragmatic encroachment; 9.5 Transformative experience; 10: Knowledge and persons; 10.1 Statistical evidence. 
505 8 |a 10.2 An account of legal proof10.3 Applying knowledge standards of proof; 10.4 Racial and other profiling; 10.5 Applying the rule of consideration; Appendix: A formal semantics for epistemic vocabulary; A.1 Background; A.2 Epistemic modals and probability operators; A.3 Simple sentences; A.4 Indicative conditionals; A.5 Other logical operators; References; Index. 
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