The logic of financial nationalism : the challenges of cooperation and the role of international law /

Using case studies ranging from cross-border bank resolution to sovereign debt, the author analyzes the role of international law in protecting financial sovereignty, and the risks for the global financial system posed by the lack of international cooperation. Despite the post-crisis reforms, the gl...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Lupo-Pasini, Federico (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Temas:
International finance > Law and legislation.
Debts, Public > Law and legislation.
Capital movements > Law and legislation.
Foreign exchange > Law and legislation.
Banking law > European Union countries.
Economic stabilization.
Stabilisation économique.
LAW > Military.
Banking law
Capital movements > Law and legislation
Debts, Public > Law and legislation
Economic stabilization
Foreign exchange > Law and legislation
International finance > Law and legislation
European Union countries
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Half Title
  • Title page
  • Imprints page
  • Contents
  • List of Tables
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • Financial Integration and Instability
  • 1 The Logic of Externalities
  • 1.1. An Interconnected Financial System
  • 1.1.1. A Typical Bank Balance Sheet
  • 1.1.2. Financial Infrastructures
  • 1.2. Systemic Risk
  • 1.3. The Logic of Externalities
  • 1.3.1. Firmsâ#x80;#x99; Behaviors
  • 1.3.2. Negative Externalities
  • 1.3.3. Externalities and the Law
  • 1.3.4. Prudential Regulations
  • 1.4. Financial Stability and the State
  • 1.4.1. Choice of Players1.4.2. Distribution of Losses
  • 1.4.3. Contractual Rights and Legal Protection
  • 2 Nationalism and Cooperation in International Finance
  • 2.1. Financial Integration and Global Systemic Risk
  • 2.2. Global Financial Stability in a World of Sovereign States
  • 2.2.1. The National Interest
  • 2.2.2. Principalâ#x80;#x93;Agent Model in an International Setting
  • 2.3. Coordination Problems
  • 2.4. Externalities and the Role of International Law
  • 2.5. The Logic of Financial Nationalism
  • 2.5.1. Financial Nationalism in International Law
  • 2.5.2. Financial Nationalism as a Negative Externality2.6. When International Law Works
  • 3 The Perils of Home-Country Control
  • 3.1. Homeâ#x80;#x93;Host Supervisory Cooperation in International Law
  • 3.1.1. The Beginnings: The 1975 Concordat and Host Country Dominance
  • 3.1.2. The Rise of Home-Country Control in Banking Supervision
  • 3.2. The Evolution of the Home-Country Model in Europe
  • 3.3. Home-Country Model and Financial Integration
  • 3.4. The Logic of Financial Nationalism in Home-Country Failures
  • 3.4.1. Principalâ#x80;#x93;Agent Problems
  • 3.4.2. The Lack of Accountability3.5. The Icesave Dispute
  • 3.6. Concluding Remarks
  • 4 Cross-Border Banking
  • 4.1. Crisis Resolution Policies in International Law
  • 4.1.1. The Policy of Financial Crises
  • 4.1.2. The Challenges of an International Legal Regime
  • 4.2. Regulatory Asymmetries in Bank Insolvency Regimes
  • 4.2.1. Regulatory Asymmetries in Bank Insolvency Regimes
  • 4.2.2. Ring-Fencing and â#x80;#x9C;Stability Warsâ#x80;#x9D;
  • 4.3. The Bailout Game
  • 4.3.1. The Economics of International Bailouts
  • 4.3.2. The Resolution of Fortis Bank
  • 4.4. Challenges in International Bail-ins4.5. The FSBâ#x80;#x99;s Standards on International Cooperation
  • 4.5.1. The FSB Principles for Cross-Border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions
  • 4.5.2. Challenges Ahead
  • 5 Nationalism in Sovereign Debt
  • 5.1. The Political Economy of Sovereign Borrowing and Defaults
  • 5.2. Fiscal Sovereignty and Moral Hazard
  • 5.3. The Economics of Financial Necessity
  • 5.4. Financial Nationalism in Sovereign Debt Restructurings
  • 5.5. Which Solutions? Private Mechanisms v. International Law

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