Consciousness and object : a mind-object identity physicalist theory /

Mostrar otras versiones (1)
Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Manzotti, Riccardo (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Amsterdam ; Philadelphia : John Benjamins Publishing Company, [2017]
Colección:Advances in consciousness research ; v. 95.
Temas:
Cognition.
Consciousness.
Cognition
Consciousness
Conscience.
cognition.
PHILOSOPHY > Movements > Humanism.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Intro
  • Consciousness and Object
  • Editorial page
  • Title page
  • LCC data
  • Table of contents
  • Foreword
  • Acknowledgements
  • 1. A materialist theory of the mind
  • 2. Naïve materialism
  • 2.1 The standard view
  • 2.2 The digestive model of the mind
  • 2.3 The hallucinatory model of perception
  • 2.4 Physiological minds and mechanical worlds
  • 2.5 The object-object problem
  • 2.6 Inner man and inner world
  • 2.7 Am I my body?
  • 3. Consciousness and nature
  • 3.1 Neural local supervenience and internalism
  • 3.2 Brain in a vat are no starters
  • 3.3 Misperception by and large
  • 3.4 Mental and physical are different
  • 3.5 The issue of representation and the vehicle/content dichotomy
  • 3.6 Appearance vs reality
  • 4. A mind-object identity theory
  • 4.1 Identity theories and consciousness
  • 4.2 brainbound
  • 4.3 objectbound
  • 4.4 Where am I?
  • 4.5 Mind and world
  • 4.6 The inner world is outside
  • 4.7 Linguistic boobytraps
  • 4.8 There's no distance between experience and world
  • 5. The actual object
  • 5.1 Actual objects vs naïve objects
  • 5.2 Existence and causation
  • 5.3 The joint cause
  • 5.4 Relative existence
  • 5.5 Bodies are object-makers
  • 5.6 Actual objects and time
  • 5.7 A hoard of actual objects
  • 5.8 Spatiotemporal objects
  • 6. Consciousness, body, and world
  • 6.1 The actual world
  • 6.2 Brains are never isolated
  • 6.3 Causal carvings
  • 6.4 Temporal unfolding
  • 6.5 Causal simultaneity
  • 6.6 Present and past are relative
  • 6.7 Time lag debunked
  • 7. All experience is identity
  • 7.1 Modes of perception
  • 7.2 A taxonomy for hallucinations
  • 7.3 Hallucinations and dreams
  • 7.4 Identity and hallucination
  • 7.5 The common-kind assumption turned upside down
  • 7.6 Illusions
  • 8. Neuroscientific evidence
  • 8.1 Penfield and direct brain stimulation
  • 8.2 Congenitally blind subjects and visual experience.
  • 8.3 Hallucinations caused by sensory blockage
  • 8.4 Persisting objects
  • 8.5 Filtering the world: The case of afterimages
  • 8.6 Supersaturated red and other impossible colors
  • 9. Subjectivity reloaded
  • 9.1 Is the phenomenal physical?
  • 9.2 One kind of property to rule them all
  • 9.3 Subjective and objective are relative
  • 9.4 Measurement and causality
  • 9.5 Experience and knowledge
  • 9.6 Perceptual error
  • 9.7 Incorrigibility
  • 9.8 Feeling vs functioning
  • 10. A reduction
  • 10.1 The hard problem
  • 10.2 Intentionality or aboutness
  • 10.3 What it is like to be something
  • 10.4 Points of view and perspectivalness
  • 10.5 Semantics is identity
  • Anchor 55
  • 11. A comparison with other views
  • 11.1 Idealism
  • 11.2 Enactivism
  • 11.3 Direct realism
  • 11.4 Russellian monism
  • 11.5 Panpsychism
  • 11.6 Soul-less Descartes
  • 12. The last blow to the narcissism of man
  • Index.

Ejemplares similares