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The logic of securities law /
This book explains both financial markets and securities regulation in simple yet sophisticated terms.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY :
Cambridge University Press,
2017.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover ; Half-title page; Title page; Copyright page; Dedication; Contents; List of Figures and Tables; Foreword; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction: Real Markets and Financial Markets; A. Differences between Financial and Real Markets; B. The Structure of Stock Markets; C. The Interdependence of the Real with the Financial Sector; Part I Definition of a Security: When to Leave Buyer Beware for Seller Disclose; 2 Toward Defining a Security; 3 The Vacuous Definition of a Security; A. The Investment Contract Foundation: Howey and Forman; B. How Motivations Unravel the Definition.
- 4 The Function of Investment ContractA. Evaluation Difficulty at Time of Offer; B. Lack of Future Control; C. Seller Disclose and Buyer Beware; 5 Pricing Mechanisms; A. Supply-Demand; B. The Capital Asset Pricing Model; C. Goods Subject to Each Pricing Mechanism; 6 From the Sale-of-Business Doctrine to Gustafson; A. Registration Process Primer; B. Gustafson as Earthquake; C. No Rubble after Gustafson; D. Gustafson Contained?; 7 Gustafson Works!; A. Repealing Rescission beyond Control Transactions Was Correct; B. Fraud Protection Is Not Excessive; 8 Definition Conclusion.
- Part II Disclosure: Why Subsidize Informed Traders?9 Introduction; 10 An Overview of Disclosure Theories; A. Fraud Prevention; B. Collective Action; C. Accurate Pricing; D. Evidence of Efficiency, Inefficiency, and Irrationalities; E. Disclosure Subsidizes Informed Trading; 11 Failure of the Corporate Disclosure Decision; A. Disclosure Policy and Holding Periods; B. Holding Period Drift; C. Conclusion: Disclosure Reveals Securities Regulation as the Congruent Law of Liquidity; Part III Deterrence of Securities Fraud; 12 Introduction to Deterrence Intensity.
- 13 Comparing the Economic Function of Deceit to That of Securities FraudA. Price Formation; B. Differences in the Incentive to Verify; 14 Reliance in Deceit and Securities Fraud; A. Justifiable Reliance in Common-Law Deceit; B. Securities Fraud Reliance: Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption; 15 Conclusion of Deterrence Intensity; Part IV Insider Trading; 16 Introduction to Insider Trading; 17 Insider Trading Law; A. Direct Prohibitions; B. Antifraud Foundations; 18 Defining Insiders; A. The Transaction Cost Generated by Informed Trading.
- B. Monopolistic and Competitive Informed Trading: The Prohibition of Insider Trading as a Reduction of Informed Profits19 Concluding the Insider Trading Analysis; Part V The Virtuous Cycle of Liquid Markets, Accurate Prices, and Cheap Trading; 20 The Virtuous Cycle; A. The Cycle; B. Liquidity as a Public Good; 21 Closing Note: Financial Crises and Securities Law; A. The Transmission of Financial Crises to the Real Sector; B. The 2008 Crisis as an Illustration; C. The Effective Antieuphoria Components; D. The Lead Culprit and Proposed Countermeasures.