Manipulative voting dynamics /
One of the most actively growing subareas in multi-agent systems is computational social choice theory, which provides a theoretical foundation for preference aggregation and collective decision-making in multi-agent domains. It is concerned with the application of techniques developed in computer s...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autor principal: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Newcastle upon Tyne :
Cambridge Scholars Publishing,
2017.
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Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Abstract; Acknowledgments; List of Figures; Chapter One; 1.1 Background; 1.1.1 Manipulative Dynamics; 1.1.2 Tactical Voting Dynamics; 1.2 Related Work; 1.3 Problem Statement; 1.3.1 Contribution and Comparison with Previous Work; 1.3.2 Significance and Importance of the Problem; 1.3.3 Specific Research Questions; 1.4 Structure of Book; Chapter Two; 2.1 Notation and Assumptions; 2.2 Definitions; 2.2.1 Manipulations; 2.2.1.1 Types of Moves; 2.2.1.2 Types of Manipulations; 2.2.1.3 Weights Settings; 2.2.2 Existence of Potential Functions and Pure Nash Equilibria; 2.3 Summary
- Chapter Three3.1 Tactical Voting; 3.1.1 Process Termination for Plurality Rule; 3.1.2 Process Termination for other Positional Scoring Rules; 3.1.2.1 Borda; 3.1.2.2 Veto and K-approval Voting Rule; 3.2 Weighted Votes; 3.2.1 The Plurality Rule; 3.2.2 Borda; 3.3 Conclusions; Chapter Four; 4.1 Increased Support Manipulative Dynamics with Weighted Votes; 4.1.1 A Few Examples of Manipulative Dynamics with Increased Support for the Winning Candidate at Each State; 4.1.2 Upper Bound for General Weight Setting; 4.1.3 Bound for a Small Number of Voters
- 4.1.3.1 Upper Bound for Bounded Real Weight Setting4.1.4 Upper Bound when the Smallest Weight is <1; 4.1.5 An Upper Bound under Bounded Integer Weight Setting; 4.1.6 Efficient Process; 4.2 Other Voting Rules like Copeland; 4.2.1 Process Termination; 4.2.2 A Few Examples of Manipulative Dynamics with Copeland Voting Scheme; 4.3 Decreased Support Manipulative Dynamics; 4.3.1 How Long is the Sequence of Moves?; 4.4 Conclusions; Chapter Five; 5.1 Mixture of Different Moves; 5.2 Bounds in Terms of the Number of Distinct Weights; 5.2.1 Manipulation dynamics with un-weighted voters
- 5.3 ConclusionsChapter Six; 6.1 Termination with a Tie-breaking Rule; 6.1.1 Veto Rule; 6.1.2 Borda Rule; 6.1.3 k-Ma jority Rule or k-Approval Voting Rule; 6.1.4 Copeland's Rule; 6.1.5 Bucklin Scheme; 6.1.6 Plurality with Run-off; 6.2 Process Termination when in Initial Settings, True and Declared Preferences of Voters are the same; 6.2.1 Borda Rule; 6.2.2 k-Approval Voting Rule; 6.2.3 Copeland's Rule; 6.2.4 Bucklin Scheme; 6.2.5 Veto Rule; 6.3 Conclusions; Chapter Seven; 7.1 Summary of Major Findings; 7.2 Implications of the Findings; 7.3 Suggestions for Further Research; Endnotes