Cargando…

Manipulative voting dynamics /

One of the most actively growing subareas in multi-agent systems is computational social choice theory, which provides a theoretical foundation for preference aggregation and collective decision-making in multi-agent domains. It is concerned with the application of techniques developed in computer s...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Gohar, Neelam (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Newcastle upon Tyne : Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a2200000Ia 4500
001 EBSCO_ocn987738451
003 OCoLC
005 20231017213018.0
006 m o d
007 cr |n|||||||||
008 170518s2017 enk ob 000 0 eng d
040 |a YDX  |b eng  |e pn  |c YDX  |d N$T  |d EBLCP  |d IDEBK  |d MERUC  |d N$T  |d OCLCF  |d OCLCQ  |d NRC  |d UKMGB  |d OCLCO  |d ESU  |d UKAHL  |d OCLCQ  |d AJS  |d ELBRO  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO 
015 |a GBB799739  |2 bnb 
016 7 |a 018364154  |2 Uk 
019 |a 987251197  |a 987344118  |a 987432804 
020 |a 9781443892308  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 1443892300  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |z 1443898791 
020 |z 9781443898799 
029 1 |a AU@  |b 000060100679 
029 1 |a UKMGB  |b 018364154 
029 1 |a AU@  |b 000069469035 
035 |a (OCoLC)987738451  |z (OCoLC)987251197  |z (OCoLC)987344118  |z (OCoLC)987432804 
037 |a 9781443892308  |b Cambridge Scholars Publishing 
050 4 |a QA76.76.I58 
072 7 |a COM  |x 000000  |2 bisacsh 
082 0 4 |a 006.3  |2 23 
049 |a UAMI 
100 1 |a Gohar, Neelam,  |e author. 
245 1 0 |a Manipulative voting dynamics /  |c by NeelamGohar. 
260 |a Newcastle upon Tyne :  |b Cambridge Scholars Publishing,  |c 2017. 
300 |a 1 online resource 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
505 0 |a Abstract; Acknowledgments; List of Figures; Chapter One; 1.1 Background; 1.1.1 Manipulative Dynamics; 1.1.2 Tactical Voting Dynamics; 1.2 Related Work; 1.3 Problem Statement; 1.3.1 Contribution and Comparison with Previous Work; 1.3.2 Significance and Importance of the Problem; 1.3.3 Specific Research Questions; 1.4 Structure of Book; Chapter Two; 2.1 Notation and Assumptions; 2.2 Definitions; 2.2.1 Manipulations; 2.2.1.1 Types of Moves; 2.2.1.2 Types of Manipulations; 2.2.1.3 Weights Settings; 2.2.2 Existence of Potential Functions and Pure Nash Equilibria; 2.3 Summary 
505 8 |a Chapter Three3.1 Tactical Voting; 3.1.1 Process Termination for Plurality Rule; 3.1.2 Process Termination for other Positional Scoring Rules; 3.1.2.1 Borda; 3.1.2.2 Veto and K-approval Voting Rule; 3.2 Weighted Votes; 3.2.1 The Plurality Rule; 3.2.2 Borda; 3.3 Conclusions; Chapter Four; 4.1 Increased Support Manipulative Dynamics with Weighted Votes; 4.1.1 A Few Examples of Manipulative Dynamics with Increased Support for the Winning Candidate at Each State; 4.1.2 Upper Bound for General Weight Setting; 4.1.3 Bound for a Small Number of Voters 
505 8 |a 4.1.3.1 Upper Bound for Bounded Real Weight Setting4.1.4 Upper Bound when the Smallest Weight is <1; 4.1.5 An Upper Bound under Bounded Integer Weight Setting; 4.1.6 Efficient Process; 4.2 Other Voting Rules like Copeland; 4.2.1 Process Termination; 4.2.2 A Few Examples of Manipulative Dynamics with Copeland Voting Scheme; 4.3 Decreased Support Manipulative Dynamics; 4.3.1 How Long is the Sequence of Moves?; 4.4 Conclusions; Chapter Five; 5.1 Mixture of Different Moves; 5.2 Bounds in Terms of the Number of Distinct Weights; 5.2.1 Manipulation dynamics with un-weighted voters 
505 8 |a 5.3 ConclusionsChapter Six; 6.1 Termination with a Tie-breaking Rule; 6.1.1 Veto Rule; 6.1.2 Borda Rule; 6.1.3 k-Ma jority Rule or k-Approval Voting Rule; 6.1.4 Copeland's Rule; 6.1.5 Bucklin Scheme; 6.1.6 Plurality with Run-off; 6.2 Process Termination when in Initial Settings, True and Declared Preferences of Voters are the same; 6.2.1 Borda Rule; 6.2.2 k-Approval Voting Rule; 6.2.3 Copeland's Rule; 6.2.4 Bucklin Scheme; 6.2.5 Veto Rule; 6.3 Conclusions; Chapter Seven; 7.1 Summary of Major Findings; 7.2 Implications of the Findings; 7.3 Suggestions for Further Research; Endnotes 
520 |a One of the most actively growing subareas in multi-agent systems is computational social choice theory, which provides a theoretical foundation for preference aggregation and collective decision-making in multi-agent domains. It is concerned with the application of techniques developed in computer science, including complexity analysis and algorithm design, in the study of social choice mechanisms, such as voting. It seeks to import concepts from social choice theory into Artificial Intelligence and computing. People often have to reach a joint decision despite conflicting preferences over the. 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references. 
590 |a eBooks on EBSCOhost  |b EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide 
650 0 |a Artificial intelligence. 
650 0 |a Intelligent agents (Computer software) 
650 0 |a Voting. 
650 2 |a Artificial Intelligence 
650 6 |a Intelligence artificielle. 
650 6 |a Agents intelligents (Logiciels) 
650 6 |a Vote. 
650 7 |a artificial intelligence.  |2 aat 
650 7 |a voting.  |2 aat 
650 7 |a Political science & theory.  |2 bicssc 
650 7 |a Society & social sciences.  |2 bicssc 
650 7 |a Mathematics.  |2 bicssc 
650 7 |a COMPUTERS  |x General.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a Artificial intelligence  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Intelligent agents (Computer software)  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Voting  |2 fast 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Gohar, Neelam.  |t Manipulative voting dynamics.  |d Newcastle upon Tyne : Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017  |z 1443898791  |z 9781443898799  |w (OCoLC)973905228 
856 4 0 |u https://ebsco.uam.elogim.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1517769  |z Texto completo 
938 |a eLibro  |b ELBO  |n ELB150329 
938 |a Askews and Holts Library Services  |b ASKH  |n AH32772818 
938 |a ProQuest Ebook Central  |b EBLB  |n EBL4857985 
938 |a EBSCOhost  |b EBSC  |n 1517769 
938 |a ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection  |b IDEB  |n cis38187494 
938 |a YBP Library Services  |b YANK  |n 14431246 
994 |a 92  |b IZTAP