Cargando…
A study on existence : two approaches and a deflationist compromise /
The problem of existence is reputed to be one of the oldest and most intractable problems of philosophy: what do we mean when we say that something exists or, even more challengingly, that something does not exist? Intuitively, it seems that we all have a firm grip upon what we are saying. But how s...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Newcastle upon Tyne :
Cambridge Scholars Publishing,
2017.
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Table of Contents; Preface; Acknowledgements; List of Tables; Introduction; Part One: The Non-Property View; Chapter One; 1.1 Attempts at Urbanizing Hume; 1.2 The Most Perfect Assurance of Being; 1.3 The Most Clear and Conclusive Dilemma; 1.4 On External Existence; 1.5 A First Occurrence of the Paradox of Non-Existence; 1.6 To Exist and to Be Believed; 1.7 Objections; Chapter Two; 2.1 Real and Logical Predicates; 2.2 Pars Destruens; 2.3 Comparison with Hume and Frege; 2.4 Pars Construens; 2.5 Kant, Neo-Meinongianism and the Ontological Argument; 2.6 Objections; Chapter Three
- 3.1 Mental In-Existence3.2 To Judge Is to Accept or Reject; 3.3 Brentano's Existential Reformulation of the Square of Opposition; 3.4 Hume and Brentano on Existence and Belief/Acceptance; 3.5 Twardowski on Contents and Objects of Ideas; 3.6 Twardowski and the Property-View of Existence; 3.7 Objections; Chapter Four; 4.1 The Meaningless Reading of "to Exist"; 4.2 Existence and the Particular Quantifier; 4.3 The Self-Evident Reading of "to Exist"; 4.4 Singular Statements and the Sense/Reference Distinction; 4.5 Stabilizing Frege's Account; 4.6 A Second Occurrence of the Paradox of Non-Existence
- 4.7 Digression on Russell and Quine4.8 Objections; Part Two: The Property View; Chapter Five; 5.1 Meinong and Brentano; 5.2 Meinong's Solution to the Paradox of Non-Existence; 5.3 Terminological Remarks; 5.4 Being-Objectives and So-Being-Objectives and their Independence; 5.5 Meinong's B-Strategy; 5.6 Russell's Objections; 5.7 Meinong's Answers to the Paradoxes of Characterization; 5.8 Objections; 5.9 MacColl and the Early Russell on Existence; Chapter Six; 6.1 Almost a New Solution to the Paradox of Non-Existence; 6.2 On Impossible Objects and Contradictory Statements
- 6.3 Constitutive and Extra-Constitutive Properties6.4 Nuclear and Extra-Nuclear Properties; 6.5 Quine's Possible Man in the Doorway; 6.6 Answer to Quine's Challenge; 6.7 Objections; Chapter Seven; 7.1 Rapaport; 7.2 Zalta; 7.3 The Unrestricted Characterization Principle; 7.4 Objections; Chapter Eight; 8.1 The Perfectly Ordinary Property of Existence; 8.2 The Representing-Operator; 8.3 Constant Domains; 8.4 Objections; Interlude; Chapter Nine; 9.1 The Existence-Predicate; 9.2 Negative, Neuter and Positive Free Logics; 9.3 Supervaluations and Superinterpretations; 9.4 Free Dialogic Logic
- 9.5 ObjectionsPart Three: The Deflationist Compromise; Chapter Ten; 10.1 A Raw Intuition; 10.2 Fregeanism; 10.3 Neo-Meinongianism; 10.4 The Attempt at a Compromise; 10.5 A Second Raw Intuition; 10.6 Deflationism and Meta-Ontology; Chapter Eleven; 11.1 Actualism and Possibilism; 11.2 The Rationale behind Actualism and Possibilism; 11.3 The Modal Raw Intuition; 11.4 A Second Modal Raw Intuition; 11.5 Presentism and Contingentism; Chapter Twelve; 12.1 Propositional Attitudes Reports; 12.2 Objectual Attitudes Reports; 12.3 A Further Objectual Attitude Report; Chapter Thirteen