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Knowledge, dexterity, and attention : a theory of epistemic agency /
Contemporary cognitive science clearly tells us that attention is modulated for speech and action. While these forms of goal-directed attention are very well researched in psychology, they have not been sufficiently studied by epistemologists. In this book, Abrol Fairweather and Carlos Montemayor de...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2017.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover ; Half-title page; Title page; Copyright page; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction: Why Only Agents Are Knowers; I.1 Aims and Motivations; I.2 Dexterity, Attention, and Integration; I.3 A Brief Summary of Chapters; I.4 A Tension in Virtue Epistemology; I.5 Virtue Theoretic Epistemic Psychology; I.6 The Attention-Assertion Model; I.7 Methodology in Epistemology; 1 Epistemic Virtue, Reliable Attention, and Cognitive Constitution; 1.1 The Argument from Attention; 1.2 Dispositions and Epistemic Abilities; 1.3 The Situationist Challenge; 1.4 Knowledge of Syntax; 1.5 Knowledge of Logic.
- 1.6 Arguments against Consequentialist Epistemic Norms2 Meta-epistemology and Epistemic Agency; 2.1 On the Role of Motivational States; 2.2 The Direction of Attention: Self or World; 2.3 Cognitive Needs; 2.4 The Desire to Assert: The Content of Epistemic Motivation; 2.5 Epistemic Needs and the Grip of Epistemic Norms; 2.6 Frege on the Grip of Assertion; 2.7 The Frame Problem and Virtuous Insensitivity; 2.8 Some Concerns about Internal Normative Force; 3 Success Semantics and the Etiology of Success; 3.1 The "Because of" Requirement for Knowledge; 3.2 Greco's Contextualist Etiology.
- 3.3 Causality: Folksy, Metaphysical, and Psychologically Constrained3.4 Success Semantics and the Etiology of Success; 3.5 Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey: Reliability and Assertion; 3.6 The Norm of Assertion; 3.7 Assertion and Action; 4 Epistemic Agency; 4.1 Tensions between Credit, Agency, and Automaticity; 4.2 Sosa's Judgments and Functionings: Personal and Sub-personal Success; 4.3 Mental and Epistemic Action; 4.4 Resolving the Tension; 4.5 Language and Agency; 5 Assertion as Epistemic Motivation; 5.1 Attention and Communication; 5.2 Dispositions to Assert and Successful Communication.
- 5.3 Forms of Assertoric Force and Forms of Epistemic Attention5.4 Factivity, Credit, and Social Environments; 5.5 Epistemically Virtuous Halting Thresholds and Assertable Contents: The Case of Epistemic Modals; 5.6 Retraction and Virtuous Sensitivity; 5.7 Conclusion; 6 Curiosity and Epistemic Achievement; 6.1 Epistemically Virtuous Curiosity; 6.2 Basic Principles of Curiosity; 6.3 Curiosity and Halting Thresholds; 6.4 Curiosity and Virtuous Insensitivity; 6.5 Attention, Curiosity, and Creativity; 7 Collective Agency, Assertion, and Information.
- 7.1 Collective Epistemic Agency and Cognitive Integration7.2 Collective Agency and Reliable Social Communication; 7.3 Social Epistemology and Collective Assertion; 7.4 Collective Attention and Collective Motivation; 7.5 Reflection, Explicit Judgment, and Reliability; 7.6 Complex Collective Agency; Bibliography; Index.