Cargando…
Discovering prices : auction design in markets with complex constraints /
Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith's famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unneces...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
New York :
Columbia University Press,
[2017]
|
| Colección: | Kenneth J. Arrow lecture series (New York, N.Y.)
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
MARC
| LEADER | 00000cam a2200000 i 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | EBSCO_ocn969973847 | ||
| 003 | OCoLC | ||
| 005 | 20231017213018.0 | ||
| 006 | m o d | ||
| 007 | cr ||||||||||| | ||
| 008 | 170123s2017 nyu ob 001 0 eng | ||
| 010 | |a 2017003117 | ||
| 040 | |a DLC |b eng |e rda |e pn |c DLC |d OCLCO |d OCLCQ |d IDEBK |d YDX |d YDX |d OCLCO |d A7U |d MERUC |d OCLCF |d OCLCQ |d N$T |d DEGRU |d OCLCO |d EBLCP |d CGU |d UPM |d IDB |d NJR |d COCUF |d STF |d LOA |d CUY |d ZCU |d ICG |d INT |d K6U |d U3W |d OCLCQ |d LVT |d VT2 |d WYU |d S9I |d TKN |d OCLCQ |d DKC |d OCLCQ |d UX1 |d OL$ |d RECBK |d OCLCQ |d AJS |d HS0 |d OCLCO |d OCLCQ |d DGITA |d OCLCO | ||
| 019 | |a 984657523 |a 1055368949 |a 1066504260 |a 1101719283 |a 1227643419 |a 1228536447 | ||
| 020 | |a 9780231544573 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 023154457X |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 0231175981 | ||
| 020 | |a 9780231175982 | ||
| 020 | |z 9780231175982 |q (hardcover ; |q alkaline paper) | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.7312/milg17598 |2 doi | |
| 029 | 1 | |a AU@ |b 000059526729 | |
| 029 | 1 | |a AU@ |b 000066763159 | |
| 029 | 1 | |a DKDLA |b 820120-katalog:999930443305765 | |
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)969973847 |z (OCoLC)984657523 |z (OCoLC)1055368949 |z (OCoLC)1066504260 |z (OCoLC)1101719283 |z (OCoLC)1227643419 |z (OCoLC)1228536447 | ||
| 042 | |a pcc | ||
| 050 | 4 | |a HF5476 |b .M549 2017 | |
| 072 | 7 | |a BUS |x 073000 |2 bisacsh | |
| 072 | 7 | |a BUS |x 043000 |2 bisacsh | |
| 072 | 7 | |a BUS |x 058000 |2 bisacsh | |
| 082 | 0 | 0 | |a 381/.1701 |2 23 |
| 084 | |a QH 430 |2 rvk |0 (DE-625)rvk/141581: | ||
| 049 | |a UAMI | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Milgrom, Paul R. |q (Paul Robert), |d 1948- |e author. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Discovering prices : |b auction design in markets with complex constraints / |c Paul Milgrom. |
| 264 | 1 | |a New York : |b Columbia University Press, |c [2017] | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (xii, 232 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 347 | |a text file | ||
| 347 | |b PDF | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Kenneth J. Arrow lecture series | |
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Introduction -- (Near- )substitutes, prices, and stability -- Vickrey auctions and substitution -- Deferred acceptance auctions and near-substitutes -- Conclusion. | |
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed. | |
| 520 | |a Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith's famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What's needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom--the world's most frequently cited academic expert on auction design--describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world's growing complex resource allocation problems. | ||
| 546 | |a In English. | ||
| 590 | |a eBooks on EBSCOhost |b EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Auctions |x Mathematical models. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Auction theory. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Prices |x Mathematical models. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Vente aux enchères |x Modèles mathématiques. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Théorie des enchères. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Prix |x Modèles mathématiques. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |x Commerce. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |x Marketing |x General. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |x Sales & Selling |x General. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Auction theory |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Auctions |x Mathematical models |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Prices |x Mathematical models |2 fast | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Milgrom, Paul R. (Paul Robert), 1948- |t Discovering prices. |d New York : Columbia University Press, 2017 |z 9780231175982 |w (DLC) 2016046839 |
| 830 | 0 | |a Kenneth J. Arrow lecture series (New York, N.Y.) | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://ebsco.uam.elogim.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1628763 |z Texto completo |
| 938 | |a Digitalia Publishing |b DGIT |n DIGCOLUP0664 | ||
| 938 | |a De Gruyter |b DEGR |n 9780231544573 | ||
| 938 | |a EBL - Ebook Library |b EBLB |n EBL5276090 | ||
| 938 | |a EBSCOhost |b EBSC |n 1628763 | ||
| 938 | |a ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection |b IDEB |n cis37521437 | ||
| 938 | |a Recorded Books, LLC |b RECE |n rbeEB00795955 | ||
| 938 | |a YBP Library Services |b YANK |n 13971351 | ||
| 994 | |a 92 |b IZTAP | ||