The bounds of freedom : Kant's causal theory of action /
Greenberg tackles one of Kant's most difficult ideas: that we can be the cause of our actions only if the act of our will is free of everything that makes up who we are as individuals. This entails that our free will does not exist in the same time that includes our individuality. The key is an...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autor principal: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Berlin [Germany] ; Boston [Massachusetts] :
De Gruyter,
2016.
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Colección: | Kantstudien. Ergänzungshefte ;
Bd. 191. |
Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Preface
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Causal Theories of Objects and Grice's Causal Theory of Perception
- 3. Kant's Theory of Practical Causality
- 4. Conscience: Remembering One's Forbidden Actions
- 5. The New Problem of the Imputability of Actions
- 6. Maxims and Categorical Imperatives
- 7. Necessity and Practical A Priori Knowledge: Kant and Kripke
- 8. The Bounds of Freedom
- References
- Subject index.