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The price of a vote in the Middle East : clientelism and communal politics in Lebanon and Yemen /
"Clientelism and ethnic favoritism appear to go hand-in-hand in many diverse societies in the developing world. But, while some ethnic communities receive generous material rewards for their political support, others receive very modest payoffs. The Price of a Vote in the Middle East examines t...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
New York, NY :
Cambridge University Press,
2016.
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| Colección: | Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover ; Half-title ; Series information ; Title page ; Copyright information ; Table of contents ; List of figures; List of tables; 1 Introduction; 1.1 An Empirical Puzzle; 1.2 Ethnicity, Clientelism, and Development; 1.2.1 Clarifying Terms; 1.2.2 Diversity and Development; 1.2.3 Clientelistic Constituencies; 1.2.4 Ethnicity and Clientelism; 1.3 The Argument; 1.3.1 Uncertainty in Clientelistic Exchange; 1.3.2 Monitoring and Delivering; 1.3.3 Clientelism and Ethnic Networks; 1.3.4 Ethnic Monopsonies; 1.3.5 Observable Implications; 1.4 The Evidence; 1.4.1 Why Lebanon and Yemen?
- 1.4.2 Data and Methods1.4.3 Findings; 1.5 Plan of the Book; 2 Ethnic Constituencies in the Market for Votes; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Transactions in the Market for Votes; 2.2.1 Patron-Client Linkages; 2.2.2 Barriers to Clientelistic Exchange; 2.2.3 Tools to Reduce Transaction Costs; 2.3 Ethnicity and Transaction Costs; 2.3.1 Demand-Based Mechanisms; 2.3.2 Transactions-Based Mechanisms; 2.3.3 Transacting in Ethnic Networks; 2.4 Ethnicity and Protected Vote Markets; 2.4.1 Origins of Monopsony; 2.4.2 Monopsony Maintenance; 2.5 Implications; 2.5.1 Market Power; 2.5.2 Which Voters?
- 2.5.3 Elite Strategies2.6 Conclusion; 3 Communal Politics in Lebanon; 3.1 Introduction: An Electoral Puzzle; 3.2 Institutions and Communalism; 3.3 Christian Competition; 3.3.1 Competing Factions in the Independence Era; 3.3.2 Rivalries and Splits in the Independence Intifada; 3.3.3 Intensifying Factional Rivalries; 3.3.4 Real if Uninspiring Choice; 3.3.5 Christians in Demand; 3.4 Shia Cartel; 3.4.1 Emerging Competition in the Independence Era; 3.4.2 Constrained Rivalry in the Post-War Era; 3.4.3 Closing Ranks After the Independence Intifada; 3.4.4 Uneasy Alliance
- 3.5 Sunni Monopsony3.5.1 Pre-War Competition; 3.5.2 Wartime Vacuum; 3.5.3 The Post-War "Money Militia" ; 3.5.4 Maintaining Dominance; 3.5.5 Sunni Dominance in Comparative Perspective; 3.6 Conclusion; 4 Communal Politics in Yemen; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Institutions and the Politics of Unification; 4.2.1 Two Yemens; 4.2.2 United Yemen; 4.3 Communal Politics in United Yemen; 4.4 Competition for Sunni Support; 4.4.1 Conservative and Progressive Voters; 4.4.2 Retribalizing Voters; 4.4.3 Southern Voters; 4.5 Stagnant Competition for Zaydi Support; 4.5.1 Early Unity-Era Competition
- 4.5.2 The "Wahhabi" Push 4.5.3 Eliminating Zaydi Alternatives; 4.5.4 The Patronage Pull; 4.5.5 Zaydi Stagnation and Sunni Competitiveness; 4.6 Conclusion; 5 Contemporary Clientelism; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Parties and Programs; 5.3 Personalized Politics; 5.4 Partisanship in Comparative Perspective; 5.5 Patrons and Clients; 5.6 Communal Clienteles; 5.7 Machines in Motion; 5.7.1 Observing and Inferring Voting Behavior; 5.7.2 Rural Clientelism; 5.8 Conclusion; 6 Captive Audiences and Public Services; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Cheap Votes and Poor Services; 6.3 Hypotheses