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|a 1016374661
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|a 9781316412404
|q (electronic bk.)
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|z 9781107127647
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|z (OCoLC)1016374661
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|a JF1525.C66
|b S38 2016
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|a 364.1/323
|2 23
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|a UAMI
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|a Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A.,
|e author.
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|a Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption /
|c Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Margit Tavits.
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|a New York, NY :
|b Cambridge University Press,
|c 2016.
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|a 1 online resource (1 volume)
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|a text
|b txt
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|a "Corruption is a significant problem for democracies throughout the world. Even the most democratic countries constantly face the threat of corruption and the consequences of it at the polls. Why are some governments more corrupt than others, even after considering cultural, social, and political characteristics? In Clarity of Responsibility, Accountability, and Corruption, the authors argue that clarity of responsibility is critical for reducing corruption in democracies. The authors provide a number of empirical tests of this argument, including a cross-national time-series statistical analysis to show that the higher the level of clarity the lower the perceived corruption levels. Using survey and experimental data, the authors show that clarity causes voters to punish incumbents for corruption. Preliminary tests further indicate that elites respond to these electoral incentives and are more likely to combat corruption when clarity is high"--
|c Provided by publisher.
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|a Includes bibliographical references and index.
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|a Print version record.
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|a Cover; Half title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; Defining corruption; Political, socioeconomic, and cultural explanations for corruption; Institutional explanations for corruption; A theory of clarity of responsibility; Scope, data, and outline of the book; 2 A clarity of responsibility theory of corruption; The concept of clarity of responsibility; The argument; Hypotheses; Conclusion; 3 A dataset of democracy and corruption; Measuring democracy; Measuring parliamentarism and presidentialism
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|a Measuring aggregate corruptionConclusion; 4 Clarity of responsibility and aggregate corruption perceptions; Variables and methods; Additional measures of clarity and accountability; Conclusion; 5 Corruption voting: a survey analysis; Clarity and corruption voting in the CSES data; Clarity and corruption voting in the ISSP data; Conclusion; 6 Corruption voting: an experimental analysis; Description of the survey experiment; Results of the experimental test; Extensions: probing the mechanisms; Conclusion; 7 Elite anticorruption efforts
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|a Clarity of responsibility and elite incentives to combat corruptionAnticorruption programs in Eastern Europe; Global patterns in anticorruption legislation; Conclusion; 8 Elite attention to corruption; Clarity of responsibility and elite incentives to emphasize corruption in election campaigns; Clarity and elite attitudes toward corruption; Conclusion; 9 Conclusions; Scholarly implications; Policy implications; Future inquiry; Appendices; 4.1 Descriptive statistics, global sample; 4.2 Robustness tests and additional models; 5.1 Vote choice question wording
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|a 5.2 Descriptive statistics from CSES and ISSP surveys5.3 Additional tables and figures from CSES and ISSP models; 6.1 Descriptive statistics, survey experiment; 6.2 Additional regression output, survey experiment; 7.1 Datasets and descriptive statistics for elite efforts to combat corruption; 7.2 Additional models; 8.1 Descriptive statistics and additional models for Chapter 8; References; Index
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|a eBooks on EBSCOhost
|b EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide
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650 |
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|a Political corruption.
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|a Corruption (Politique)
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|a SOCIAL SCIENCE
|x Criminology.
|2 bisacsh
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|a Political corruption
|2 fast
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|a Korruption
|2 gnd
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|a Politik
|2 gnd
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|a Tavits, Margit,
|e author.
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|i Print version:
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