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Serial sovereign defaults and debt restructurings /

Emerging countries that have defaulted on their debt repayment obligations in the past are more likely to default again in the future than are non-defaulters even with the same external debt-to-GDP ratio. These countries actually have repeated defaults or restructurings in short periods. This paper...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Asonuma, Tamon ((IMF staff))
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Tustin, CA : Xist Publishing, 2015.
[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2016.
Colección:IMF working paper ; WP/16/66.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Descripción
Sumario:Emerging countries that have defaulted on their debt repayment obligations in the past are more likely to default again in the future than are non-defaulters even with the same external debt-to-GDP ratio. These countries actually have repeated defaults or restructurings in short periods. This paper explains these stylized facts within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework by explicitly modeling renegotiations between a defaulting country and its creditors. The quantitative analysis of the model reveals that the equilibrium probability of default for a given debt-to-GDP level is weakly increasing with the number of past defaults. The model also accords with an additional fact: lower recovery rates (high NPV haircuts) are associated with increases in spreads at renegotiation.--Abstract.
Notas:"March 2016."
"Research Department."
"WP/16/65" on page [one] refers to: Natural disasters and food crises in low-income countries.
Descripción Física:1 online resource (45 pages) : illustrations.
Bibliografía:Includes bibliographical references (pages 41-44).
ISBN:9781475521818
1475521812
1513596640
9781513596648
1475561954
9781475561951
ISSN:1018-5941
1018-5941 ;