The politics of military coalitions /
Military coalitions are ubiquitous. The United States builds them regularly, yet they are associated with the largest, most destructive, and consequential wars in history. When do states build them, and what partners do they choose? Are coalitions a recipe for war, or can they facilitate peace? Fina...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autor principal: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
New York, NY :
Cambridge University Press,
2015.
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Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover
- Half Title
- Title
- Copyright
- Contents
- List Of Figures
- List Of Tables
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Rethinking Multilateralism
- 1.2 The Argument
- 1.3 Conclusion
- 2 Why Coalitions?
- 2.1 Defining Coalitions
- 2.1.1 Coalitions Versus Treaties Of Alliance
- 2.1.2 Military Versus Diplomatic Multilateralism
- 2.2 The Process Of Military Multilateralism
- 2.2.1 Coalition Formation
- 2.2.2 Crisis Bargaining
- 2.2.3 Conflict Expansion
- 2.2.4 Summary
- 2.3 Introducing The Coalitions Data
- 2.3.1 Identifying Coalitions
- 2.3.2 The Characteristics Of Coalitions
- 2.3.3 Crisis Escalation And Conflict Expansion
- 2.4 Summary And Discussion
- 2.5 Appendix
- 3 Power, Preferences, And Cooperation
- 3.1 The Price Of Cooperation
- 3.2 A Theory Of Coalition Formation
- 3.2.1 The Model
- 3.2.2 Analysis
- 3.3 Empirical Models Of Coalition Formation
- 3.3.1 Hypotheses
- 3.3.2 Research Design
- 3.3.3 Results: Coalition Formation
- 3.3.4 Results: Coalition Diversity
- 3.4 Application: Turkey And The Iraq Wars
- 3.5 Summary And Discussion
- 3.6 Appendix
- 3.6.1 Proofs
- 3.6.2 Assessing Potential Selection Bias
- 4 Cooperation, Signaling, And War
- 4.1 The Challenge Of Credibility
- 4.2 A Theory Of Coalitional Crisis Bargaining
- 4.2.1 The Model
- 4.2.2 Analysis
- 4.3 An Empirical Model Of Crisis Escalation
- 4.3.1 Hypotheses
- 4.3.2 Research Design
- 4.3.3 Results: Crisis Escalation
- 4.4 Application: The Berlin And Kosovo Crises
- 4.5 Summary And Discussion
- 4.6 Appendix
- 5 Durability, Balancing, And Conflict Expansion
- 5.1 The Threat Of Expansion
- 5.2 A Theory Of Formation, Balancing, And Durability
- 5.2.1 The Model
- 5.2.2 Analysis
- 5.3 Empirical Models Of Expansion And Durability
- 5.3.1 Hypotheses
- 5.3.2 Research Design: Conflict Expansion
- 5.3.3 Results: Conflict Expansion.
- 5.3.4 Research Design: Coalitional Durability
- 5.3.5 Results: Coalitional Durability
- 5.4 Application: Pakistan, Iran, And The Superpowers
- 5.5 Summary And Discussion
- 5.6 Appendix
- 5.6.1 Proofs
- 5.6.2 Victorious Coalitions And Their Members
- 6 Conclusion
- 6.1 Public And Private Stakes In International Cooperation
- 6.2 Allied And Nonallied Coalitions
- 6.3 The United States And Military Multilateralism
- 6.4 A Coalitions Research Agenda
- Bibliography
- Index.