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Regulating business for peace : the United Nations, the private sector, and post-conflict recovery /

The first book to study how peace operations have engaged with business to influence its peace-building impact in fragile and conflict-affected societies.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Ford, Jolyon
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Machine generated contents note: pt. I CONTEXT
  • 1. Business and Peace: Describing the Gap
  • 1.1. Regulation
  • 1.1.1. General: Matching Private Influence with Public Accountability
  • 1.1.2. Specific: Existing Schemes to Regulate Business Impact on Peace
  • 1.2. Law
  • 1.2.1. International Law and Business Responsibility
  • 1.2.2. International Law and Post-Conflict Situations
  • 1.3. Policy
  • 1.3.1. Policy Frameworks on Fragile States and Conflict-Sensitive Business Practices
  • 1.3.2. Policy Frameworks on Engaging the Business Sector in Peace and Development
  • 1.4. Literature
  • 1.4.1. The Political Economy of Peace and Conflict
  • 1.4.2. Peacebuilding and the Business Sector: The General Gap
  • 1.4.3. Peacebuilding and the Business Sector: The Specific Gap
  • pt. II PRACTICE
  • 2. The Gap in Peace Operation Mandates, Strategies, and Practice
  • 2.1. The Evolution of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding
  • 2.1.1. A Working Typology of Peace Operations
  • 2.1.2. Peace Operations as Regulators: Existing and Analogous Practice
  • 2.2. Identifying the Gap: The Lack of Explicit Mandates to Engage Business
  • 2.2.1. Identifying the Gap: Findings
  • 2.2.2. Illustrating the Gap: Examples
  • 3. East Timor/Timor-Leste 1999
  • 2009
  • 3.1. Context
  • 3.1.1. Before 1999: Colonisation, Occupation, Conflict
  • 3.1.2. After 1999: The Task Facing UNTAET
  • 3.2. Actions: UNTAET as a Transitional Business Regulator
  • 3.2.1. Generic Business Regulation by UNTAET
  • 3.2.2. UNTAET and the Impact of Business on Peacebuilding
  • 3.3. Omissions: UNTAET's Legacy of UN Neglect of the Business Sector
  • 3.3.1. Failure to Engage the Business Sector: Patterns
  • 3.3.2. Failure to Engage the Business Sector: Reasons
  • 3.4. Evaluation
  • 3.4.1. Lost Opportunities: Two Examples
  • 3.4.2. Lost Opportunities: The Peacebuilding Legacy
  • 4. Liberia 2003
  • 2013
  • 4.1. Context
  • 4.1.1. Slavery and Statehood: Violence and Plunder
  • 4.1.2. Civil Conflicts: T̀he Business of War' and Sanctions
  • 4.1.3. The 2003 Peace Agreement and Creation of UNMIL
  • 4.1.4. 2003: The Challenge Facing UNMIL
  • 4.2. Actions: UNMIL as a Regulator of Sanctions-Affected Sectors
  • 4.2.1. Diamonds
  • 4.2.2. Timber
  • 4.3. Actions: UNMIL as a Regulator of the Rubber Sector
  • 4.3.1. The Rubber Task Force
  • 4.3.2. Balancing Community and Concessionary Interests
  • 4.4. Omissions: UNMIL and Contract-Making by the Transitional Government
  • 4.4.1. The Major Resource Contract Negotiations
  • 4.4.2. Evaluation of UNMIL Inaction on Contract-Making
  • 4.5. Omissions: Examples of Lost Opportunities to Engage the Business Sector
  • 4.5.1. The Capital: Non-Engagement with Liberian Business Groups
  • 4.5.2. The Counties: UNMIL and F̀unny Games' in Buchanan
  • 4.5.3. The Iron Ore Sector: Security Engagement and No More
  • 4.6. Evaluation
  • pt. III THEORY
  • 5. A Theory of Transitional Business Regulation
  • 5.1. Theories of Responsive Regulation and Networked Governance
  • 5.1.1. Responsive Regulation Theory
  • 5.1.2. The Regulatory P̀yramid'
  • 5.1.3. Networked Nodal Governance
  • 5.2. A Theory of Transitional Business Regulation
  • 5.2.1. Attribute A: R̀ESPONSIVE'
  • 5.2.2. Attribute B: R̀ESPONSIBLE'
  • 5.2.3. Attribute C: R̀EALISTIC'
  • 6. The Policy Basis for a Transitional Regulatory Role
  • 6.1. Facing the C̀ompliance Trap'
  • 6.2. Responsibility in Regulation of the Business Sector
  • 6.2.1. The Undue Influence Critique
  • 6.2.2. The C̀apture' or Corruption Critique
  • 6.2.3. The T̀urn to Ethics' Critique
  • 6.3. Regulatory Roles for Outsiders in Post-Conflict Societies
  • 6.3.1. Questions of Effectiveness
  • 6.3.2. Questions of Legitimacy
  • 6.4. Reinforcing the Policy Foundations of Transitional Business Regulation
  • 6.4.1. Between the Ostrich and the Trojan Horse
  • 6.42. Moving beyond Critical Apprehensions
  • 6.4.3. The UN Security Council and Regulatory Roles for Peace Operations
  • pt. IV FUTURE
  • 7. Incipient Practice by Peace Operations
  • 7.1. Despite the Gap: Signs of Incipient Regulation of Business for Peace
  • 7.1.1. Implicit Mandates
  • 7.1.2. Examples of Incipient Practice
  • 7.2. Closing the Gap? Emerging Practice in Special Political Missions
  • 7.2.1. The Integrated Peacebuilding Missions in Africa
  • 7.2.2. The UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA)
  • 8. Implementing Transitional Business Regulation
  • 8.1. Seeing Like a Regulator: Regulatory Disposition
  • 8.1.1. Regulatory Disposition
  • 8.1.2. Seeing Like a Regulator
  • 8.1.3. Mandating Transitional Business Regulation
  • 8.2. Seeing Business: R̀esponsible' Regulation and Principled Engagement
  • 8.2.1. A Blind-Spot for the Business Sector
  • 8.2.2. Future Encounters: Interaction as Regulation
  • 8.2.3. Responsibility in Engaging with Business
  • 8.3. Seeing Others: R̀esponsive' Regulation and Networked Governance
  • 8.3.1. From Theory to Practice in Networking Business for Peace
  • 8.3.2. Addressing Practical Difficulties
  • 8.4. Seeing Clearly: R̀ealistic' Regulation and Gradually M̀uddling Through'.