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Separation of Powers and Legislative Organization : the President, the Senate, and political parties in the making of House rules /
Examines how constitutional requirements of the lawmaking process, and the factional divisions within parties, affect US representatives' decisions on distributing power among themselves.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2014.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Half-title; Endorsement; Title page; Copyright information; Dedication; Table of contents; List of figures and tables; Acknowledgments; 1 A Constitutional Perspective on House Organization; 2 Constitutional Actors and Intraparty Groups; Constitutional Actors; Intraparty Groups; Identifying Intraparty Groups; Majority Intraparty Groups within the Democratic and Republican Parties; Conclusion; 3 A Constitutional Theory of Legislative Organization; Theories and Models of Lawmaking in the United States; The Model: Explaining Changes in House Organization; The Power-Sharing Game.
- The Legislative GameStage 1: Bicameral Agreement; Stage 2: Constitutional Rules; Equilibrium Properties; Conclusion; 4 Timing of House Organizational Changes; Timing of Rule Changes: Current Perspectives; Constitutional Actors and the Timing of Rule Changes: Empirical Implications; The Model's Implications for Timing: When Do House Members Adopt New Rules?; House Rules: Defining the Universe of Rules and Organizational Changes; Constitutional Actors and the Timing of Rule Changes: Empirical Analysis; House Rule Changes, 1961; House Rule Changes, 1995-2013; House Rule Changes, 1879-2013.
- Conclusion5 The Senate and White House Shadows: Centralization and Decentralization ... ; The Directionality of Rule Changes: Current Perspectives; Theory: Explaining the Directionality of Rule Changes; Centralization of Power
- Empowering the Speaker; Decentralization of Power
- Revolting against One's Own Leader; Decentralization of Power
- Empowering Outliers; Empirical Implications: The Directionality of Rule Changes; Empirical Analysis: Data and Measurement; Measuring the Positions of Constitutional Actors: House Factions, the Senate, and the President.
- Rules and the Distribution of Power within the Majority Party: Coding Centralization ... Analysis; No Changes in CS; Change in CS and the Non-Speaker Group Gained an Ally (Allies) in the Senate and/or President ... ; Change in CS and Senate and President Move Closer to the Speaker Group (Non-Speaker Group Has No Outside Allies); Change in CS and the House Minority Party Gains Control of President and Senate; Multinomial Analysis; Conclusion; 6 New Rules for an Old Speaker: Revisiting the 1910 Revolt against Speaker Cannon; The Revolt against Speaker Cannon; Prevailing Interpretation of the Revolt.
- Is the Prevailing Interpretation Correct?Timing of the Revolt: Why Did the Progressives Revolt Only after Cannon Had Been Serving ... ; Why Not a Revolt before the 1909 CS Changes?; Regulation of Corporations; Conservation of Natural Resources Program; Social Welfare Acts; The Tariff Schedule; Why Did the Revolt Happen a Year after Taft's Election?; The Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act; Taft's Program on Regulation and Conservation; Directionality of the Revolt; Presidential Change, Policy Differences, and Roll Call Data.